United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942)
December
15, 1941; Decided February 2, 1942
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK
Mr. Justice DOUGLAS
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This action
was brought by the United States to recover the assets of the New York branch
of the First Russian Insurance Co. which remained in the hands of repondent after the payment of all domestic creditors. The
material allegations of the complaint were in brief as follows:
The First
Russian Insurance Co., organized under the laws of the former Empire of Russia,
established a New York branch in 1907. It deposited with the Superintendent of
Insurance, pursuant to the laws of New York, certain assets to secure payment
of claims resulting from transactions of its New York branch. By certain laws,
decrees, enactments and orders in 1918 and 1919 the Russian Government
nationalized the business of insurance and all of the property, whereever situated, of all Russian insurance companies
(including the First Russian [315 U.S. 203, 211] Insurance Co.), and discharged and cancelled all
the debts of such companies and the rights of all shareholders in all such
property. The New York branch of the First Russian Insurance Co. continued to
do business in New York until 1925. At that time respondent, pursuant to an
order of the Supreme Court of New York, took possession of its assets for a
determination and report upon the claims of the policyholders and creditors in
the United States. Thereafter all claims of domestic creditors, i.e., all
claims arising out of the business of the New York branch, were paid by
respondent, leaving a balance in his hands of more than $1,000,000. In 1931 the
New York Court of Appeals (People, by
Beha, v. First Russian Ins. Co., 255 N.Y. 415, 175 N.E. 114) directed
respondent to dispose of that balance as follows: first, to pay claims of
foreign creditors who had filed attachment prior to the commencement of the
liquidation proceeding and also such claims as were filed prior to the entry of
the order on remittitur of that court; and second, to pay any surplus to a
quorum of the board of directors of the company. Pursuant to that mandate,
respondent proceeded with the liquidation of the claims of the foreign
creditors. Some payments were made thereon. The major portion of the allowed
claims, however, were not paid, a stay having been granted pending disposition
of the claim of the United States. On November 16, 1933, the United States
recognized the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the de jure Government of
Russia and as an incident to that recognition accepted an assignment (known as
the Litvinov Assignment) of certain claims. 1 The
Litvinov Assignment was in the form of a letter dated November 16, 1933, to the
President of the United States from Maxim Litvinov, People's Commissar for
Foreign Affairs, reading as follows: [315 U.S. 203, 212] 'Following our conversations I have the honor to
inform you that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
agrees that, preparatory to a final settlement of the claims and counter claims
between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the
United States of America and the claims of their nationals, the Government of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will not take any steps to enforce any
decisions of courts or initiate any new litigations for the amounts admitted to
be due or that may be found to be due it, as the successor of prior Governments
of Russia, or otherwise, from American nationals, including corporations,
companies, partnerships, or associations, and also the claim against the United
States of the Russian Volunteer Fleet, now in litigation in the United States
Court of Claims, and will not object to such amounts being assigned and does
hereby release and assign all such amounts to the Government of the United
States, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to be duly
notified in each case of any amount realized by the Government of the United
States from such release and assignment.
'The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics further
agrees, preparatory to the settlement referred to above not to make any claims
with respect to:
'(a)
judgments rendered or that may be rendered by American courts in so far as they
relate to property, or rights, or interests therein, in which the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics or its nationals may have had or may claim to have
an interest; or,
'(b) acts
done or settlements made by or with the Government of the United States, or
public officials in the United States, or its nationals, relating to property,
credits, or obligations of any Government of Russia or nationals thereof.'
This was
acknowledged by the President on the same date. The acknowledgement, after
setting forth the terms of the assignment, concluded: [315
U.S. 203, 213] 'I am
glad to have these undertakings by your Government and I shall be pleased to
notify your Government in each case of any amount realized by the Government of
the United States from the release and assignment to it of the amounts admitted
to be due, or that may be found to be due, the Government of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, and of the amount that may be found to be due on the claim
of the Russian Volunteer Fleet.'
On
November 14, 1934, the United States brought an action in the federal District
Court for the Southern District of New York, seeking to recover the assets in
the hands of respondent. This Court held in United
States v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., 296 U.S. 463 , 56 S.Ct.
343, that the well settled 'principles governing the convenient and orderly
administration of justice require that the jurisdiction of the state court
should be respected' (page 480 of 296 U.S., page 348 of 56 S. Ct.); and that
whatever might be 'the effect of recognition' of the Russian Government, it did
not terminate the state proceedings. Page 479 of 296 U.S., page 348 of 56 S.Ct.. The United States was remitted to the state court
for determination of its claim, no opinion being intimated on the merits. Page
481 of 296 U.S., page 348 of 56 S.Ct.. The United
States then moved for leave to intervene in the liquidation proceedings. Its
motion was denied 'without prejudice to the institution of the time-honored
form of action'. That order was affirmed on appeal.
Thereafter
the present suit was instituted in the Supreme Court of New York. The
defendants, other than respondent, were certain designated policy holders and
other creditors who had presented in the liquidation proceedings claims against
the corporation. The complaint prayed, inter alia, that the United States be
adjudged to be the sole and exclusive owner entitled to immediate possession of
the entire surplus fund in the hands of the respondent.
Respondent's
answer denied the allegations of the complaint that title to the funds in
question passed to the[315
U.S. 203, 214] United
States and that the Russian decrees had the effect claimed. It also set forth
various affirmative defenses-that the order of distribution pursuant to the
decree in People, by Beha, v. First
Russian Ins. Co., 255 N.Y. 415, 175 N.E. 114 could not be affected by the
Litvinov Assignment; that the Litvinov Assignment was unenforceable because it
was conditioned upon a final settlement of claims and counter claims which had
not been accomplished; that under Russian law the nationalization decrees in
question had no effect on property not factually taken into possession by the
Russian Government prior to May 22, 1922; that the Russian decrees had no
extraterritorial effect, according to Russian law; that if the decrees were
given extraterritorial effect, they were confiscatory and their recognition
would be unconstitutional and contrary to the public policy of the United
States and of the State of New York; and that the United States under the
Litvinov Assignment acted merely as a collection agency for the Russian
Government and hence was foreclosed from asserting any title to the property in
question.
The
answer was filed in March, 1938. In April, 1939 the New York Court of Appeals
decided Moscow Fire Ins. Co. v. Bank of
New York & Trust Co., 280 N.Y. 286, 20 N.E.2d 758. In May, 1939
respondent (but not the other defendants) moved pursuant to Rule 113 of the
Rules of the New York Civil Practice Act and 476 of that Act for an order
dismissing the complaint and awarding summary judgment in favor of respondent
'on the ground that there is no merit to the action and that it is insufficient
in law'. The affidavit in support of the motion stated that there was 'no
dispute as to the facts'; that the separate defenses to the complaint 'need not
now be considered for the complaint standing alone is insufficient in law';
that the facts in the Moscow case and the instant one, so far as material, were
'parallel' and the Russian de- [315 U.S. 203, 215] crees the same; and that the Moscow case authoritatively settled the
principles of law governing the instant one. The affidavit read in opposition
to the motion stated that a petition for certiorari in the Moscow case was
about to be filed in this Court; that the motion was premature and should be denied
or decision thereon withheld pending the final decision of this Court. On June
29, 1939, the Supreme Court of New York granted the motion and dismissed the
complaint 'on the merits', citing only the Moscow case in support of its
action. On September 2, 1939, a petition for certiorari in the Moscow case was
filed in this Court. The judgment in that case was affirmed here by an equally
divided Court. United States v. Moscow
Fire Ins. Co., 309 U.S. 624 , 60 S.Ct.
725. Subsequently the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York
affirmed, without opinion, the order of dismissal in the instant case. The
Court of Appeals affirmed with a per curiam opinion
(284 N.Y. 555, 32 N.E. 2d 552) which after noting that the decision below was
'in accord with the decision' in the Moscow case stated:
'Three of the judges of this court concurred in a forceful opinion
dissenting from the court's decision in that case, but the decision left open no
question which has been argued upon this appeal. We are agreed that without
again considering such questions this court should, in determining title to
assets of First Russian Insurance Company, deposited in this State, apply in
this case the same rules of law which the court applied in the earlier case in
determining title to the assets of Moscow Fire Insurance Company deposited
here.'
We
granted the petition for certiorari because of the nature and public importance
of the questions raised. 313 U.S. 553 , 61 S.Ct.
960.
* * *
Third: The
question of whether the decree should be given extraterritorial effect is of
course a distinct matter. One primary issue raised in that connection is
whether under our constitutional system New York law can be allowed to stand in
the way.
The
decision of the New York Court of Appeals in the Moscow case is unequivocal. It held that 'under the law of this
State such confiscatory decrees do not affect the property claimed here' (280
N.Y. page 314, 20 N. E.2d page 769); [315 U.S. 203, 222] that the property of the New York branch
acquired a 'character of its own' which was 'dependent' on the law of New York
(page 310 of 280 N.Y., page 767 of 20 N.E.2d); that no 'rule of comity and no
act of the United States government constrains this State to abandon any part
of its control or to share it with a foreign State' (page 310 of 280 N.Y., page
767 of 20 N.E. 2d); that although the Russian decree effected the death of the
parent company, the situs of the property of the New York branch was in New
York; and that no principle of law forces New York to forsake the method of
distribution authorized in the earlier appeal (People, by Beha, v. First Russian Ins. Co., 255 N.Y. 415, 175 N.E.
114) and to hold that 'the method which in 1931 conformed to the exactions of
justice and equity must be rejected because retroactively it has become
unlawful' (page 312 of 280 N. Y., page 768 of 20 N.E.2d).
It is one
thing to hold as was done in Guaranty
Trust Co. v. United States, supra, 304 U.S. page 142, 58 S.Ct. page 793, that under the Litvinov Assignment the
United States did not acquire 'a right free of a pre-existing infirmity' such
as the running of the statute of limitations against the Russian Government,
its assignor. Unlike the problem presented here and in the Moscow case, that holding in no way sanctions the asserted power of
New York to deny enforcement of a claim under the Litvinov Assignment because of
an overriding policy of the State which denies validity in New York of the
Russian decrees on which the assigned claims rest. That power was denied New
York in United States v. Belmont, supra.
With one qualification to be noted, the Belmont
case is determinative of the present controversy.
That case
involved the right of the United States under the Litvinov Assignment to
recover from a custodian or stakeholder in New York funds which had been
nationalized and appropriated by the Russian decrees.
This Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Sutherland, held that the conduct of foreign
relations is committed by the Constitution to the political departments of the
Fed- [315 U.S. 203, 223] eral Government; that the propriety of the exercise of that power is
not open to judicial inquiry; and that recognition of a foreign sovereign
conclusively binds the courts and 'is retroactive and validates all actions and
conduct of the government so recognized from the commencement of its
existence.' Page 328 of 301 U.S., page 760 of 57 S.Ct..
It further held (page 330 of 301 U.S., page 760 of 57 S.Ct.)
that recognition of the Soviet Government, the establishment of diplomatic
relations with it, and the Litvinov Assignment were 'all parts of one
transaction, resulting in an international compact between the two
governments.' After stating that 'in respect of what was done here, the
Executive had authority to speak as the sole organ' of the national government,
it added (page 330 of 301 U.S., page 761 of 57 S.Ct.):
'The assignment and the agreements in connection therewith did not, as in the
case of treaties, as that term is used in the treaty making clause of the
Constitution (Art. 2, 2), require the advice and consent of the Senate.' It
held (page 331 of 301 U.S., page 761 of 57 S.Ct.)
that the 'external powers of the United States are to be exercised without
regard to state laws or policies. The supremacy of a treaty in this respect has
been recognized from the beginning.' And it added that 'all international
compacts and agreements' are to be treated with similar dignity for the reason
that 'complete power over international affairs is in the national government
and is not and cannot be subject to any curtailment or interference on the part
of the several states.' Page 331 of 301 U.S., page 761 of 57 S.Ct.. This Court did not stop to inquire whether in fact
there was any policy of New York which enforcement of the Litvinov Assignment
would infringe since 'no state policy can prevail against the international
compact here involved.' Page 327 of 301 U.S., page 759 of 57 S.Ct..
The New
York Court of Appeals in the Moscow
case, 280 N.Y. 309, 20 N. E.2d 758 distinguished the Belmont case on the ground that it was
decided on the sufficiency of the pleadings, the demurrer to the complaint
admitting that under the Russian decree the property was confiscated by the
Russian Government and then trans- [315 U.S. 203, 224] ferred to the
United States under the Litvinov Assignment. But, as we have seen, the Russian
decree in question was intended to have an extraterritorial effect and to
embrace funds of the kind which are here involved. Nor can there be any serious
doubt that claims of the kind here in question were included in the Litvinov
Assignment.7 It
is broad and inclusive. It should be inter- [315 U.S. 203, 225] preted
consonantly with the purpose of the compact to eliminate all possible sources
of friction between these two great nations. See Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U.S. 424, 437 , 22 S.Ct. 195, 200; Jordan
v. K. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123, 127 , 49 S.Ct. 47, 48. Strict construction would run counter to that
national policy. For, as we shall see, the existence of unpaid claims against
Russia and its nationals which were held in this country and which the Litvinov
Assignment was intended to secure, had long been one impediment to resumption
of friendly relations between these two great powers. [315
U.S. 203, 226] The
holding in the Belmont case is therefore determinative of the present
controversy unless the stake of the foreign creditors in this liquidation
proceeding and the provision which New York has provided for their protection
call for a different result.
Fourth: The Belmont case forecloses any relief to
the Russian corporation. For this Court held in that case (301 U.S. at page
332, 57 S. Ct. at page 761): '... our Constitution, laws, and policies have no
extraterritorial operation, unless in respect of our own citizens. ... What
another country has done in the way of taking over property of its nationals,
and especially of its corporations, is not a matter for judicial consideration
here. Such nationals must look to their own government for any redress to which
they may be entitled.'
But it is
urged that different considerations apply in case of the foreign creditors8
to whom the New York Court of Appeals (People,
by Beha, v. First Russian Ins. Co., 255 N.Y. 415, 175 N.E. 114) ordered
distribution of these funds. The argument is that their rights in these funds
have vested by virtue of the New York decree; that to deprive them of the
property would violate the Fifth Amendment which extends its protection to
aliens as well as to citizens; and that the Litvinov Assignment cannot deprive
New York of its power to administer the balance of the fund in accordance with
its laws for the benefit of these creditors.
At the
outset it should be noted that, so far as appears, all creditors whose claims
arose out of dealings with the New York branch have been paid. Thus we are not
faced with the question whether New York's policy of protecting [315
U.S. 203, 227] the
so-called local creditors by giving them priority in the assets deposited with
the State (Matter of People by Stoddard,
242 N.Y. 148, 158, 159, 151 N.E. 159, 45 A.L.R. 622) should be recognized
within the rule of Clark v. Williard, 294 U.S. 211 , 55 S.Ct.
356, 98 A.L.R. 347, or should yield to the Federal policy expressed in the
international compact or agreement. Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30, 40 , 52 S.Ct.
81, 84; United States v. Belmont, supra.
We intimate no opinion on that question. The contest here is between the United
States and creditors of the Russian corporation who, we assume, are not
citizens of this country and whose claims did not arise out of transactions
with the New York branch. The United States is seeking to protect not only
claims which it holds but also claims of its nationals. H.Rep.
No. 865, 76th Cong ., 1st Sess. Such claims did not
arise out of transactions with this Russian corporation; they are, however,
claims against Russia or its nationals. The existence of such claims and their
non-payment had for years been one of the barriers to recognition of the Soviet
regime by the Executive Department. Graham, Russian-American Relations,
1917-1933: An Interpretation, 28 Am.Pol.Sc.Rev. 387; 1 Hackworth, Digest of International Law (1940) pp. 302-304. The purpose of the
discussions leading to the policy of recognition was to resolve 'all questions
outstanding' between the two nations. Establishment of Diplomatic Relations
with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Dept. of State, Eastern European
Series, No. 1 (1933), p. 1. Settlement of all American claims against Russia
was one method of removing some of the prior objections to recognition based on
the Soviet policy of nationalization. The Litvinov Assignment was not only part
and parcel of the new policy of recognition (id., p. 13); it was also the
method adopted by the Executive Department for alleviating in this country the
rigors of nationalization. Congress tacitly recognized that policy. Acting in
anticipation of the realization of funds under the Litvinov [315
U.S. 203, 228] Assignment
(H.Rep. No. 865, 76th Cong., 1st Sess.) it authorized
the appointment of a Commissioner to determine the claims of American nationals
against the Soviet Government. Joint Resolution of August 4, 1939, 53 Stat.
1199.
If the
President had the power to determine the policy which was to govern the
question of recognition, then the Fifth Amendment does not stand in the way of
giving full force and effect to the Litvinov Assignment. To be sure, aliens as
well as citizens are entitled to the protection of the Fifth Amendment. Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481 , 51 S.Ct.
229. A State is not precluded, however, by the Fourteenth Amendment from
according priority to local creditors as against creditors who are nationals of
foreign countries and whose claims arose abroad. Disconto Gesellschaft v. Umbreit, 208 U.S. 570 , 28 S.Ct.
337. By the same token, the Federal Government is not barred by the Fifth
Amendment from securing for itself and our nationals priority against such
creditors. And it matters not that the procedure adopted by the Federal
Government is globular and involves a regrouping of assets. There is no
Constitutional reason why this Government need act as the collection agent for
nationals of other countries when it takes steps to protect itself or its own
nationals on external debts. There is no reason why it may not through such
devices as the Litvinov Assignment make itself and its nationals whole from
assets here before it permits such assets to go abroad in satisfaction of claims
of aliens made elsewhere and not incurred in connection with business conducted
in this country. The fact that New York has marshaled the claims of the foreign
creditors here involved and authorized their payment does not give them
immunity from that general rule.
If the
priority had been accorded American claims by treaty with Russia, there would
be no doubt as to its validity. Cf. Santovincenzo v. Egan,
supra. The same result [315 U.S. 203, 229] obtains here. The powers of the President in the
conduct of foreign relations included the power, without consent of the Senate,
to determine the public policy of the United States with respect to the Russian
nationalization decrees. 'What government is to be regarded here as
representative of a foreign sovereign state is a political rather than a
judicial question, and is to be determined by the political department of the
government.' Guaranty Trust Co. v. United
States, supra, 304 U.S. page 137, 58 S.Ct. page
791. That authority is not limited to a determination of the government to be
recognized. It includes the power to determine the policy which is to govern
the question of recognition. Objections to the underlying policy as well as
objections to recognition are to be addressed to the political department and
not to the courts. See Guaranty Trust Co.
v. United States, supra, 304 U.S. page 138, 58 S.Ct.
page 791; Kennett v. Chambers, 14
How. 38, 50, 51. As we have noted, this Court in the Belmont case recognized
that the Litvinov Assignment was an international compact which did not require
the participation of the Senate. It stated (301 U.S. pages 330, 331, 57 S.Ct. pages 760, 761): 'There are many such compacts, of
which a protocol, a modus vivendi, a postal convention, and agreements like
that now under consideration are illustrations.' And see Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 331 , 54 S.Ct. 745, 751; United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 , 57 S.Ct. 216, 220. Recognition is not always absolute; it is
sometimes conditional. 1 Moore, International
Law Digest (1906), pp. 73-74; 1 Hackworth, Digest of International Law (1940), pp. 192-195. Power to remove
such obstacles to full recognition as settlement of claims of our nationals
(Levitan, Executive Agreements, 35 Ill.L.Rev. 365, 382-385) certainly is a modest implied
power of the President who is the 'sole organ of the federal government in the
field of international relations.' United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., supra, 299 U.S. page 320, 57 S.Ct. page 221. Effectiveness in handling the delicate
problems of foreign relations requires no less. Unless [315
U.S. 203, 230] such a power exists, the power
of recognition might be thwarted or seriously diluted. No such obstacle can be
placed in the way of rehabilitation of relations between this country and
another nation, unless the historic conception of the powers and
responsibilities of the President in the conduct of foreign affairs (see Moore,
Treaties and Executive Agreements, 20
Pol.Sc.Q. 385, 403-417) is to be drastically revised.
It was the judgment of the political department that full recognition of the Soviet
Government required the settlement of all outstanding problems including the
claims of our nationals. Recognition and the Litvinov Assignment were
interdependent. We would usurp the executive function if we held that that
decision was not final and conclusive in the courts.
'All constitutional acts of power, whether in the executive or in
the judicial department, have as much legal validity and obligation as if they
proceeded from the legislature; ....' The
Federalist, No. 64. A treaty is a 'Law of the Land' under the supremacy
clause, Art. VI, Cl. 2, of the Constitution. Such international compacts and
agreements as the Litvinov Assignment have a similar dignity. United States v. Belmont, supra, 301 U.
S. page 331, 57 S.Ct. page 761. See Corwin, The President, Office & Powers (1940),
pp. 228-240.
It is of
course true that even treaties with foreign nations will be carefully construed
so as not to derogate from the authority and jurisdiction of the States of this
nation unless clearly necessary to effectuate the national policy. Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, supra,
304 U.S. page 143, 58 S.Ct. page 793, and cases
cited. For example in Todok v. Union State Bank, 281 U.S. 449 , 50 S.Ct.
363, this Court took pains in its construction of a treaty, relating to the
power of an alien to dispose of property in this country, not to invalidate the
provisions of state law governing such dispositions. Frequently the obligation
of a treaty will be dependent on state law. Prevost
v. Greneaux, 19 How. 1. But state [315
U.S. 203, 231] law must
yield when it is inconsistent with or impairs the policy or provisions of a
treaty or of an international compact or agreement. See Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47 , 49 S.Ct.
223. Then the power of a State to refuse enforcement of rights based on foreign
law which runs counter to the public policy of the forum (Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498, 506 , 61 S.Ct. 1023, 1027, 134 A.L.R. 1462) must give way before the
superior Federal policy evidenced by a treaty or international compact or
agreement. Santovincenzo v. Egan, supra; United States v. Belmont,
supra.
Enforcement
of New York's policy as formulated by the Moscow
case would collide with and subtract from the Federal policy, whether it was
premised on the absense of extraterritorial effect of
the Russian decrees, the conception of the New York branch as a distinct
juristic personality, or disapproval by New York of the Russian program a
nationalization.9 For
the Moscow case refuses to give
effect or recognition in New York to acts of the Soviet Government which the
United States by its policy of recognition agreed no longer to question.
Enforcement of such state policies would indeed tend to restore some of the
precise impediments to friendly relations which the President intended to
remove on inauguration of the policy of recognition of the Soviet Government.
In the [315 U.S. 203, 232] first
place, such action by New York, no matter what gloss be given it, amounts to
official disapproval or non-recognition of the nationalization program of the
Soviet Government. That disapproval or non-recognition is in the face of a
disavowal by the United States of any official concern with that program. It is
in the face of the underlying policy adopted by the United States when it
recognized the Soviet Government. In the second place, to the extent that the
action of the State in refusing enforcement of the Litvinov Assignment results
in reduction or non-payment of claims of our nationals, it helps keep alive one
source of friction which the policy of recognition intended to remove. Thus the
action of New York tends to restore some of the precise irritants which had
long affected the relations between these two great nations and which the
policy of recognition was designed to eliminate.
We
recently stated in Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 68 , 61 S.Ct.
399, 404, that the field which affects international relations is 'the one
aspect of our government that from the first has been most generally conceded
imperatively to demand broad national authority'; and that any state power
which may exist 'is restricted to the narrowest of limits'. There we were
dealing with the question as to whether a state statute regulating aliens
survived a similar federal statute. We held that it did not. Here we are
dealing with an exclusive federal function. If state laws and policies did not
yield before the exercise of the external powers of the United States, then our
foreign policy might be thwarted. These are delicate matters. If state action
could defeat or alter our foreign policy, serious consequences might ensue. The
nation as a whole would be held to answer if a State created difficulties with
a foreign power. Cf. Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 279 , 280 S.. Certainly the
conditions for 'enduring friendship' between the nations, which the policy of
recognition in this instance was de- [315 U.S. 203, 233] signed to effectuate,10 are not
likely to flourish where contrary to national policy a lingering atmosphere of
hostility is created by state action.
Such
considerations underly the principle of Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 , 303 S., 38 S.Ct. 309, 310, 311, that when a revolutionary government
is recognized as a de jure government, 'such recognition is retroactive in
effect and validates all the actions and conduct of the government so
recognized from the commencement of its existence.' They also explain the rule
expressed in Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 , 18 S.Ct. 83, 84, that 'the courts of one country will not sit
in judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its own
territory.'
The
action of New York in this case amounts in substance to a rejection of a part
of the policy underlying recognition by this nation of Soviet Russia. Such
power is not accorded a State in our constitutional system. To permit it would
be to sanction a dangerous invasion of Federal authority. For it would 'imperil
the amicable relations between governments and vex the peace of nations.' Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., supra, 246 U.S.
page 304, 38 S.Ct. page 311. It would tend to disturb
that equilibrium in our foreign relations which the political departments of
our national government had diligently endeavored to establish.
We repeat
that there are limitations on the sovereignty of the States. No State can
rewrite our foreign policy to conform to its own domestic policies. Power over
external affairs is not shared by the States; it is vested in the national
government exclusively. It need not be so exercised as to conform to state laws
or state policies whether they be expressed in constitutions, statutes, or
judicial decrees. And the policies of the States become wholly irrelevant to
judicial inquiry, when the United States, act- [315
U.S. 203, 234] ing within its constitutional sphere, seeks enforcement of its
foreign policy in the courts. For such reasons, Mr. Justice Sutherland stated
in United States v. Belmont, supra,
301 U.S. page 331, 57 S.Ct. page 761, 'In respect of
all international negotiations and compacts, and in respect of our foreign
relations generally, state lines disappear. As to such purposes the state of
New York does not exist.'
We hold
that the right to the funds or property in question became vested in the Soviet
Government as the successor to the First Russian Insurance Co.; that this right
has passed to the United States under the Litvinov Assignment; and that the
United States is entitled to the property as against the corporation and the
foreign creditors.
The
judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the Supreme Court of New York
for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so
ordered.
Mr.
Justice REED and Mr. Justice JACKSON did not participate in the consideration
or decision of this case.
Mr.
Justice FRANKFURTER.
The
nature of the controversy makes it appropriate to add a few observations to my
Brother DOUGLAS' opinion.
Legal
ideas like other organisms cannot survive severance from their congenial
environment. Concepts like 'situs' and 'jurisdiction' and 'comity' summarize
views evolved by the judicial process, in the absence of controlling
legislation, for the settlement of domestic issues. To utilize such concepts
for the solution of controversies international in nature, even though they are
presented to the courts in the form of a private litigation, is to invoke a
narrow and inadmissible frame of reference.