In
re Neagle
135 U.S. 1 (1890)
Argued March 4, 5, 1890; Decided April 14, 1890
MR. JUSTICE MILLER, on behalf of the court, stated the case as
follows:
This was an appeal by Cunningham, sheriff of the county of San
Joaquin, in the State of California, from a judgment of the Circuit Court of
the United States for the Northern District of California, discharging David Neagle from the custody of said sheriff, who held him a
prisoner on a charge of murder.
On the 16th day of August, 1889, there was presented to Judge
Sawyer, the Circuit Judge of the United States for the Ninth Circuit, embracing
the Northern District of California, a petition signed David Neagle, deputy United States marshal, by A. T. Farrish on his behalf. This petition represented that [135
U.S. 4] the said Farrish was a deputy marshal duly
appointed for the Northern District of California by J. C. Franks, who was the
marshal of that district. It further alleged that David Neagle
was, at the time of the occurrences recited in the petition and at the time of
filing it, a duly appointed and acting deputy United States marshal for the
same district. It then proceeded to state that said Neagle
was imprisoned, confined and restrained of his liberty in the county jail in
San Joaquin County, in the State of California, by Thomas Cunningham, sheriff
of said county, upon a charge of murder, under a warrant of arrest, a copy of
which was annexed to the petition. The warrant was as follows:
"In the Justice's Court of
Stockton Township"
"STATE OF CALIFORNIA "
"COUNTY OF SAN JOAQUIN "
"The People of the State of California to any sheriff,
constable, marshal, or policeman of said State or of the county of San
Joaquin:"
"Information on oath having been this day laid before me by
Sarah A. Terry that the crime of murder, a felony, has been committed within
said County of San Joaquin on the 14th day of August, A.D. 1889, in this, that
one David S. Terry, a human being then and there being, was willfully,
unlawfully, feloniously, and with malice aforethought shot, killed and
murdered, and accusing Stephen J. Field and David Neagle
thereof: You are therefore commanded forthwith to arrest the above-named
Stephen J. Field** and David Neagle and bring them
before me at my office in the city of Stockton, or, in [135 U. S. 5] case of my absence or inability to act, before the nearest and
most accessible magistrate in the county."
"Dated at Stockton this 14th day of August, A.D. 1889."
"H. V. J. SWAIN"
"Justice of the Peace"
"The defendant, David Neagle,
having been brought before me on this warrant, is committed for examination to
the sheriff of San Joaquin County, California."
"Dated August 1, 1889. H. W. J. SWAIN"
"Justice of the Peace"
The petition then recited the circumstances of a rencontre between
said Neagle and David S. Terry, in which the latter
was instantly killed by two shots from a revolver in the hands of the former.
The circumstances of this encounter and of what led to it will be considered
with more particularity hereafter. The main allegation of this petition was
that Neagle, as United States deputy marshal, acting
under the orders of Marshal Franks, and in pursuance of instructions from the
Attorney General of the United States, had, in consequence of an anticipated
attempt at violence on the part of Terry against the Honorable Stephen J.
Field, a justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, been in attendance
upon said justice, and was sitting by his side at a breakfast table when a
murderous assault was made by Terry on Judge Field, and in defence
of the life of the judge, the homicide was committed for which eagle was held
by Cunningham. The allegation was very distinct that Justice Field was engaged
in the discharge of his duties as circuit justice of the United States for that
circuit, having held court at Los Angeles, one of the places at which the Court
is by law held, and, having left that court, was on his way to San Francisco
for the purpose of holding the Circuit Court at that place. The allegation was
also very full that Neagle was directed by Marshal
Franks to accompany him for the purpose of protecting him, and that these
orders of Franks were given in anticipation of the assault which actually occurred.
It was also stated, in more general [135 U. S. 6] terms,
that Marshal Neagle, in killing Terry under the
circumstances, was in the discharge of his duty as an officer of the United
States, and was not, therefore, guilty of a murder, and that his imprisonment
under the warrant held by Sheriff Cunningham was in violation of the laws and
Constitution of the United States, and that he was in custody for an act done
in pursuance of the laws of the United States. This petition being sworn to by Farrish, and presented to Judge Sawyer, he made the
following order:
"Let a writ of habeas corpus issue in pursuance of the prayer
of the within petition, returnable before the United States Circuit Court for
the Northern District of California."
"SAWYER, Circuit Judge"
"The writ was accordingly issued and delivered to Cunningham,
who made the following return:"
"COUNTY OF SAN JOAQUIN, State of California"
"SHERIFF'S OFFICE"
"To the honorable Circuit Court of the United States for the
Northern District of California:"
"I hereby certify and return that, before the coming to me of
the annexed writ of habeas corpus the said David Neagle
was committed to my custody, and is detained by me by virtue of a warrant
issued out of the justice's court of Stockton township, State of California,
county of San Joaquin, and by the endorsement made upon said warrant. Copy of
said warrant and endorsement is annexed hereto and made a part of this return.
Nevertheless, I have the body of the said David Neagle
before the honorable court, as I am in the said writ commanded."
"August 17, 1889. THOS.
CUNNINGHAM"
"Sheriff San Joaquin County, California"
Various pleadings and amended pleadings were made which do not
tend much to the elucidation of the matter before us. Cunningham filed a demurrer
to the petition for the writ of [135 U. S. 7] habeas corpus and Neagle filed a
traverse to the return of the sheriff, which was accompanied by exhibits, the
substance of which will be hereafter considered when the case comes to be
examined upon its facts.
The hearing in the Circuit Court was had before Circuit Judge
Sawyer and District Judge Sabin. The sheriff, Cunningham, was represented by G.
A. Johnson, Attorney General of the State of California, and other counsel. A
large body of testimony, documentary and otherwise, was submitted to the court,
on which, after a full consideration of the subject, the court made the
following order:
"In the Matter of David Neagle, on
habeas corpus."
"In the above-entitled matter, the court having heard the
testimony introduced on behalf of the petitioner, none having been offered for
the respondent, and also the arguments of the counsel for petitioner and
respondent, and it appearing to the court that the allegations of the
petitioner in his amended answer or traverse to the return of the sheriff of
San Joaquin County, respondent herein, are true, and that the prisoner is in
custody for an act done in pursuance of a law of the United States, and in
custody in violation of the Constitution and laws of the United States, it is
therefore ordered that petitioner be, and he is hereby, discharged from
custody."
From that order an appeal was allowed which brought the case to
this court, accompanied by a voluminous record of all the matters which were
before the court on the hearing.
[135 U. S. 40] MR.
JUSTICE MILLER, after stating the case as above, delivered the opinion of the
court.
If it be true, as stated in the order of the court discharging the
prisoner, that he was held
"in custody for an act done in pursuance of a law of the
United States, and in custody in violation of the Constitution and laws of the
United States,"
there does not seem to be any doubt that, under the statute on that
subject, he was properly discharged by the Circuit Court.
Section 753 of the Revised Statutes reads as follows:
"The writ of habeas corpus shall in no case extend to a prisoner
in jail unless where he is in custody under or by color [135
U. S. 41] of the authority of the United States, or is
committed for trial before some court thereof, or is in custody for an act done
or omitted in pursuance of a law of the United States, or of an order, process,
or decree of a court or judge thereof, or is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or of a law or treaty of the United States, or, being a subject or
citizen of a foreign State, and domiciled therein, is in custody for an act
done or omitted under any alleged right, title, authority, privilege,
protection, or exemption claimed under the commission, or order, or sanction of
any foreign State, or under color thereof, the validity and effect whereof
depend upon the law of nations, or unless it is necessary to bring the prisoner
into court to testify."
And section 761 declares that when, by the writ of habeas corpus,
the petitioner is brought up for a hearing, the "court or justice or judge
shall proceed in a summary way to determine the facts of the case, by hearing
the testimony and arguments, and thereupon to dispose of the party as law and
justice require."
This, of course, means that, if he is held in custody in violation
of the Constitution or a law of the United States, or for an act done or
omitted in pursuance of a law of the United States, he must be discharged.
By the law as it existed at the time of the enactment of the
Revised Statutes, an appeal could be taken to the Circuit Court from any court
of justice or judge inferior to the Circuit Court in a certain class of habeas
corpus cases. But there was no appeal to the Supreme Court in any case except
where the prisoner was the subject or citizen of a foreign State, and was
committed or confined under the authority or law of the United States or of any
State, on account of any act done or omitted to be done under the commission or
authority of a foreign State, the validity of which depended upon the law of
nations. But afterwards, by the act of Congress of March 3, 1885, 23 Stat. 437,
this was extended by amendment as follows:
"That section seven hundred and sixty-four of the Revised
Statutes be amended so that the same shall read as
follows: 'From the final decision of such Circuit Court an appeal may be taken
to the Supreme Court in the cases described in the preceding section.' "
[135 U. S. 42] The
preceding section here referred to is section 763, and is the one on which the
prisoner relies for his discharge from custody in this case.
It will be observed that, in both the provisions of the Revised
Statutes and of this latter act of Congress, the mode of review, whether by the
Circuit Court of the judgment of an inferior court or justice or judge or by
this court of the judgment of a Circuit Court, the word " appeal," and
not "writ of error," is used, and as Congress has always used these
words with a clear understanding of what is meant by them, namely, that, by a
writ of error, only questions of law are brought up for review, as in actions
at common law, while by an appeal, except when specially provided otherwise,
the entire case on both law and facts is to be reconsidered, there seems to be
little doubt that, so far as it is essential to a proper decision of this case,
the appeal requires us to examine into the evidence brought to sustain or
defeat the right of the petitioner to his discharge.
The history of the incidents which led to the tragic event of the
killing of Terry by the prisoner Neagle had its
origin in a suit brought by William Sharon of Nevada, in the Circuit Court of
the United States for the District of California, against Sarah Althea Hill,
alleged to be a citizen of California, for the purpose of obtaining a decree
adjudging a certain instrument in writing, possessed and exhibited by her,
purporting to be a declaration of marriage between them, under the code of
California, to be a forgery, and to have it set aside and annulled. This suit,
which was commenced October 3, 1883, was finally heard before Judge Sawyer, the
Circuit Judge for that circuit, and Judge Deady,
United States District Judge for Oregon, who had been duly appointed to assist
in holding the Circuit Court for the District of California. The hearing was on
September 29, 1885, and on the 15th of January, 1886, a decree was rendered
granting the prayer of the bill. In that decree, it was declared that the
instrument purporting to be a declaration of marriage,
set out and described in the bill of complaint,
"was not signed or executed at any time by William Sharon,
the complainant; that it is not [135 U. S. 43] genuine;
that it is false, counterfeited, fabricated, forged, and fraudulent, and, as
such, is utterly null and void. And it is further ordered and decreed that the
respondent, Sarah Althea Hill, deliver up and deposit with the clerk of the
court said instrument, to be endorsed 'cancelled,' and that the clerk write
across it 'cancelled' and sign his name and affix his seal thereto."
The rendition of this decree was accompanied by two opinions, the
principal one being written by Judge Deady and a
concurring one by Judge Sawyer. They were very full in their statement of the
fraud and forgery practised by Miss Hill, and stated
that it was also accompanied by perjury. And inasmuch as Mr. Sharon had died
between the hearing of the argument of the case on the 29th of September, 1885,
and the time of rendering this decision, January 15, 1886, an order was made
setting forth that fact and declaring that the decree was entered as of the
date of the hearing, nunc pro tunc.
Nothing was done under this decree. The defendant, Sarah Althea
Hill, did not deliver up the instrument to the clerk to be cancelled, but she
continued to insist upon its use in the state court. Under these circumstances,
Frederick W. Sharon, as the executor of the will of his father, William Sharon,
filed in the Circuit Court for the Northern District of California, on March
12, 1888, a bill of revivor, stating the
circumstances of the decree, the death of his father, and that the decree had
not been performed; alleging also the intermarriage of Miss Hill with David S.
Terry, of the city of Stockton in California, and making the said Terry and
wife parties to this bill of revivor. The defendants
both demurred and answered, resisting the prayer of the plaintiff, and denying
that the petitioner was entitled to any relief.
This case was argued in the Circuit Court before Field, Circuit
Justice, Sawyer, Circuit Judge, and Sabin, District Judge. While the matter was
held under advisement, Judge Sawyer, on returning from Los Angeles, in the
Southern District of California, where he had been holding court, found himself
on the train as it left Fresno, which is understood to [135
U. S. 44] have been the residence of
Terry and wife, in a car in which he noticed that Mr. and Mrs. Terry were in a
section behind him, on the same side. On this trip from Fresno to San
Francisco, Mrs. Terry grossly insulted Judge Sawyer, and had her husband change
seats so as to sit directly in front of the Judge, while she passed him with
insolent remarks, and pulled his hair with a vicious jerk, and then, in an
excited manner, taking her seat by her husband's side, said: "I will give
him a taste of what he will get by and by. Let him render this decision if he
dares," -- the decision being the one already mentioned, then under
advisement. Terry then made some remark about too many witnesses being in the
car, adding that "The best thing to do with him would be to take him out
into the bay and drown him." These incidents were witnessed by two
gentlemen who knew all the parties, and whose testimony is found in the record
before us.
This
was August 14, 1888. On the 3d of September, the court rendered its decision
granting the prayer of the bill of revivor in the
name of Frederick W. Sharon and against Sarah Althea Terry and her husband,
David S. Terry. The opinion was delivered by Mr. Justice Field, and, during its
delivery, a scene of great violence occurred in the courtroom. It appears that,
shortly before the court opened on that day, both the defendants in the case
came into the courtroom and took seats within the bar at the table next the
clerk's desk, and almost immediately in front of the judges. Besides Mr.
Justice Field, there were present on the bench Judge Sawyer and Judge Sabin of
the District Court of the United States for the District of Nevada. The
defendants had denied the jurisdiction of the court originally to render the
decree sought to be revived, and the opinion of the court necessarily discussed
this question without reaching the merits of the controversy. When allusion was
made to this question, Mrs. Terry rose from her seat and, addressing the
justice who was delivering the opinion, asked in an excited manner whether he
was going to order her to give up the marriage contract to be cancelled. Mr.
Justice Field said: "Be seated, madam." She repeated the question,
and was again told to be seated. She then said, [135 U. S. 45] in a very excited and
violent manner, that Justice Field had been bought, and wanted to know the
price he had sold himself for; that he had got Newland's money for it, and
everybody knew that he had got it, or words to that effect. Mr. Justice Field
then directed the marshal to remove her from the courtroom. She asserted that
she would not go from the room, and that no one could take her from it.
Marshal
Franks proceeded to carry out the order of the court by attempting to compel
her to leave, when Terry, her husband, rose from his seat under great
excitement, exclaiming that no man living should touch his wife, and struck the
marshal a blow in his face so violent as to knock out a tooth. He then
unbuttoned his coat, thrust his hand under his vest, apparently for the purpose
of drawing a bowie knife, when he was seized by persons present and forced down
on his back. In the meantime, Mrs. Terry was removed from the courtroom by the
marshal, and Terry was allowed to rise and was accompanied by officers to the
door leading to the marshal's office. As he was about leaving the room, or
immediately after being out of it, he succeeded in drawing a bowie knife, when
his arms were seized by a deputy marshal and others present to prevent him from
using it, and they were able to wrench it from him only after a severe
struggle. The most prominent person engaged in wresting the knife from Terry
was Neagle, the prisoner now in court.
For
this conduct, both Terry and his wife were sentenced by the court to
imprisonment for contempt, Mrs. Terry for one month and Terry for six months,
and these sentences were immediately carried into effect. Both the judgment of
the court on the petition for the revival of the decree in the case of Sharon
against Hill and the judgment of the Circuit Court imprisoning Terry and wife
for contempt have been brought to this court for review, and in both cases the
judgments have been affirmed. The report of the cases may be found in Ex parte Terry, 128 U. S. 289,
and Terry v. Sharon, 131 U. S. 40.
Terry
and Mrs. Terry were separately indicted by the grand jury of the Circuit Court
of the United States during the same term for their part in these transactions,
and the cases were [135 U. S. 46] pending in said court at the time of Terry's death. It also
appears that Mrs. Terry, during her part of this altercation in the courtroom,
was making efforts to open a small satchel which she had with her, but, through
her excitement, she failed. This satchel, which was taken from her, was found
to have in it a revolving pistol.
From
that time until his death, the denunciations by Terry and his wife of Mr.
Justice Field were open, frequent, and of the most vindictive and malevolent
character. While being transported from San Francisco to Alameda, where they
were imprisoned, Mrs. Terry repeated a number of times that she would kill both
Judge Field and Judge Sawyer. Terry, who was present, said nothing to restrain
her, but added that he was not through with Judge Field yet; and, while in jail
at Alameda, Terry said that, after he got out of jail, he would horsewhip Judge
Field, and that he did not believe he would ever return to California, but this
earth was not large enough to keep him from finding Judge Field and
horsewhipping him; and, in reply to a remark that this would be a dangerous
thing to do, and that Judge Field would resent it, he said: "if Judge
Field resents it, I will kill him." And while in jail, Mrs. Terry
exhibited to a witness Terry's knife, at which he laughed, and said, "Yes,
I always carry that," and made a remark about judges and marshals, that
"they were all a lot of cowardly curs," and he would "see some
of them in their graves yet." Mrs. Terry also said that she expected to
kill Judge Field some day.
Perhaps the clearest expression of Terry's feelings and intentions
in the matter as in a conversation with Mr. Thomas T. Williams, editor of one
of the daily newspapers of California. This interview was brought about by a
message from Terry requesting Williams to call and see him. In speaking of the
occurrences in the court, he said that Justice Field had put a lie in the
record about him, and, when he met Field, he would have to take that back,
"and if he did not take it back and apologize for having lied about him,
he would slap his face or pull his nose." "I said to him," said
the witness,
"'Judge
Terry, would not that be a dangerous thing to do? [135 U. S. 47] Justice Field is not a man
who would permit anyone to put a deadly insult upon him like that.' He said,
'Oh, Field won't fight.' I said, 'Well, Judge, I have found nearly all men will
fight; nearly every man will fight when there is occasion for it, and Judge
Field has had a character in this State of having the courage of his
convictions, and being a brave man.' At the conclusion of that branch of the
conversation, I said to him, 'Well, Judge Field is not your physical equal, and
if any trouble should occur, he would be very likely to use a weapon.' He said,
'Well, that's as good a thing as I want to get.' The whole impression conveyed
to me by this conversation was that he felt he had some cause of grievance
against Judge Field; that he hoped they might meet, that he might have an
opportunity to force a quarrel upon him, and he would get him into a
fight."
Mr.
Williams says that, after the return of Justice Field to California in the
spring or summer of 1889, he had other conversations with Terry in which the
same vindictive feelings of hatred were manifested and expressed by him.
It
is useless to go over the testimony on this subject more particularly. It is
sufficient to say that the evidence is abundant that both Terry and wife
contemplated some attack upon Judge Field during his official visit to
California in the summer of 1889 which they intended should result in his
death. Many of these matters were published in the newspapers, and the press of
California was filled with the conjectures of a probable attack by Terry on
Justice Field as soon as it became known that he was going to attend the
Circuit Court in that year.
So
much impressed were the friends of Judge Field, and of public justice, both in
California and in Washington, with the fear that he would fall a sacrifice to
the resentment of Terry and his wife that application was made to the Attorney
General of the United States suggesting the propriety of his furnishing some
protection to the judge while in California. This resulted in a correspondence
between the Attorney General of the United States, the District Attorney, and
the marshal of the Northern District of California on that subject. This
correspondence is here set out:
[135 U. S. 48] "DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE"
"WASHINGTON, April 27th, 1889"
"JOHN C. FRANKS, United States Marshal, San Francisco,
Cal."
"SIR:
The proceedings which have heretofore been had in connection with the case of
Mr. and Mrs. Terry in your United States Circuit Court have become matter of
public notoriety, and I deem it my duty to call your attention to the propriety
of exercising unusual caution in case further proceedings shall be had in that
case, for the protection of his Honor Justice Field or whoever may be called
upon to hear and determine the matter. Of course, I do not know what may be the
feelings or purpose of Mr. and Mrs. Terry in the premises, but many things
which have happened indicate that violence on their part is not impossible. It
is due to the dignity and independence of the court and the character of its
judge that no effort on the part of the government shall be spared to make them
feel entirely safe and free from anxiety in the discharge of their high
duties."
"You
will understand, of course, that this letter is not for the public, but to put
you upon your guard. It will be proper for you to show it to the district
attorney, if deemed best."
"Yours truly, W. H. H. MILLER."
"Attorney
General"
"UNITED
STATES MARSHAL'S OFFICE"
"NORTHERN
DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA"
"SAN
FRANCISCO, May 6, 1889"
"Hon. W. H. H. MILLER, Attorney General, Washington,
D.C."
"SIR: Yours of the the 27th ultimo,
at hand."
"When
the Hon. Judge Lorenzo Sawyer, our Circuit Judge, returned from Los Angeles
(some time before the celebrated court scene) and informed me of the
disgraceful action of Mrs. Terry towards him on the cars, while her husband sat
in front smilingly approving it, I resolved to watch the Terrys (and so
notified my deputies) whenever they should enter the courtroom, and be ready to
suppress the very first indignity offered by either of them to the judges.
After this, at the time of their ejectment from the courtroom, when I held
Judge Terry [135 U. S. 49] and his wife as prisoners in my private office and heard his
threats against Justice Field, I was more fully determined than ever to throw
round the Justice and Judge Sawyer every safeguard I could."
"I
have given the matter careful consideration, with the determination to fully
protect the federal judges at this time, trusting that the department will
reimburse me for any reasonable expenditure."
"I
have always, whenever there is any likelihood of either Judge or Mrs. Terry
appearing in court, had a force of deputies with myself on hand to watch their
every action. You can rest assured that, when Justice Field arrives, he, as
well as all the federal judges, will be protected from insults, and where an
order is made, it will be executed without fear as to consequences. I shall
follow your instructions and act with more than usual caution. I have already
consulted with the United States attorney, J. T. Carey, Esq., as to the
advisability of making application to you, at the time the Terrys are tried
upon criminal charges, for me to select two or more detectives to assist in the
case, and also assist me in protecting Justice Field while in my district. I
wish the judges to feel secure, and for this purpose will see to it that their
every wish is promptly obeyed. I notice your remarks in regard to the publicity
of your letter, and will obey your request. I shall only be too happy to
receive any suggestions from you at any time."
"The
opinion among the better class of citizens here is very bitter against the
Terrys, though, of course, they have their friends, and, unfortunately, among
that class it is necessary to watch."
"Your
most obedient servant, J. S. FRANKS,"
"U.S. Marshal Northern Dist. of Cal."
"SAN
FRANCISCO, CAL., May 7, 1889"
"Hon.
W. H. H. MILLER,"
"U.S. Attorney General, Washington, D.C."
"DEAR
SIR: Marshal Franks exhibited to me your letter bearing date the 27th ult.,
addressed to him upon the subject [135 U. S. 50] of using due caution by
way of protecting Justice Field and the federal judges here in the discharge of
their duties in matters in which the Terrys are interested. I noted your
suggestion with a great degree of pleasure, not because our marshal is at all disposed
to leave anything undone within his authority or power to do, but because it
encouraged him to know and feel that the Head of our Department was in full
sympathy with the efforts being made to protect the judges and vindicate the
dignity of our courts."
"I
write merely to suggest that there is just reason, in the light of the past and
the threats made by Judge and Mrs. Terry against Justice Field and Judge
Sawyer, to apprehend personal violence at any moment and at any place, as well
in court as out of court, and that, while due caution has always been taken by
the marshal when either Judge or Mrs. Terry is about the building in which the
courts are held, he has not felt it within his authority to guard either Judge
Sawyer or Justice Field against harm when away from the appraisers'
building."
"Discretion
dictates, however, that a protection should be thrown about them at other times
and places, when proceedings are being had before them in which the Terrys are
interested, and I verily believe, in view of the direful threats made against
Justice Field, that he will be in great danger at all times while here."
"Mr.
Franks is a prudent, cool, and courageous officer who will not abuse any
authority granted him. I would therefore suggest that he be authorized in his
discretion to retain one or more deputies, at such times as he may deem
necessary, for the purposes suggested. That publicity may not be given to the
matter, it is important that the deputies whom he may select be not known as
such, and that efficient service may be assured for the purposes indicated, it
seems to me that they should be strangers to the Terrys."
"The
Terrys are unable to appreciate that an officer should perform his official
duty when that duty in any way requires his efforts to be directed against
them. The marshal, his deputies, and myself suffer daily indignities and
insults from Mrs. [135 U. S. 51] Terry, in court and out of court, committed in the presence of her
husband and without interference upon his part. I do not purpose being deterred
from any duty, nor do I purpose being intimidated in the least degree from
doing my whole duty in the premises, but I shall feel doubly assured in being
able to do so knowing that our marshal has your kind wishes and encouragement
in doing everything needed to protect the officers of the court in the
discharge of their duties."
"This,
of course, is not intended for the public files of your office, nor will it be
on file in my office. Prudence dictates great caution on the part of the officials
who may be called upon to have anything to do in the premises, and I deem it to
be of the greatest importance that the suggestions back and forth be
confidential."
"I
shall write you further upon the subject of these cases in a few days."
"I
have the honor to be, your most obedient servant,"
"JOHN
T. CAREY"
"U.S.
Attorney"
"DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE"
"WASHINGTON,
D.C., May 27, 1889"
"J. C FRANKS, Esq., United States Marshal, San Francisco,
Cal."
"SIR:
Referring to former correspondence of the department relating to a possible
disorder in the session of the approaching term of court, owing to the small
number of bailiffs under your control to preserve order, you are directed to
employ certain special deputies at a per
diem of five dollars,
payable out of the appropriation for fees and expenses of marshals, to be
submitted to the court as a separate account from your other accounts against
the government for approval, under section 846, Revised Statutes, as an
extraordinary expense, that the same may be forwarded to this Department in
order to secure executive action and approval."
"Very
respectfully, W. H. H. MILLER"
"Attorney
General"
[135 U. S. 52] The result of this
correspondence was that Marshal Franks appointed Mr. Neagle
a deputy marshal for the Northern District of California, and gave him special
instructions to attend upon Judge Field both in court and while going from one
court to another, and protect him from any assault that might be attempted upon
him by Terry and wife. Accordingly, when Judge Field went from San Francisco to
Los Angeles to hold the Circuit Court of the United States at that place, Mr. Neagle accompanied him, remained with him for the few days
that he was engaged in the business of that court, and returned with him to San
Francisco.
It
appears from the uncontradicted evidence in the case
that, while the sleeping car, in which were Justice Field and Mr. Neagle, stopped a moment in the early morning at Fresno,
Terry and wife got on the train. The fact that they were on the train became
known to Neagle, and he held a conversation with the
conductor as to what peace officers could be found at Lathrop, where the train
stopped for breakfast, and the conductor was requested to telegraph to the
proper officers of that place to have a constable or some peace officer on the
ground when the train should arrive, anticipating that there might be violence
attempted by Terry upon Judge Field. It is sufficient to say that this resulted
in no available aid to assist in keeping the peace. When the train arrived, Neagle informed Judge Field of the presence of Terry on the
train, and advised him to remain and take his breakfast in the car. This the
Judge refused to do, and he and Neagle got out of the
car and went into the dining room, and took seats beside each other in the
place assigned them by the person in charge of the breakfast room, and very
shortly after this, Terry and wife came into the room, and Mrs. Terry,
recognizing Judge Field, turned and left in great haste, while Terry passed
beyond where Judge Field and Neagle were and took his
seat at another table. It was afterwards ascertained that Mrs. Terry went to
the car and took from it a satchel in which was a revolver. Before she returned
to the eating room, Terry arose from his seat and, passing around the table in
such a way as brought him behind Judge Field, who did not see him or notice
him, came [135 U. S. 53] up where he was sitting with his feet under the table, and struck him
a blow on the side of his face, which was repeated on the other side. He also
had his arm drawn back and his fist doubled up, apparently to strike a third
blow, when Neagle, who had been observing him all
this time, arose from his seat with his revolver in his hand, and in a very
loud voice shouted out: "Stop! stop! I am an
officer!" Upon this, Terry turned his attention to Neagle,
and, as Neagle testifies, seemed to recognize him,
and immediately turned his hand to thrust it in his bosom, as Neagle felt sure, with the purpose of drawing a bowie
knife. At this instant, Neagle fired two shots from
his revolver into the body of Terry, who immediately sank down and died in a
few minutes.
Mrs.
Terry entered the room with the satchel in her hand just after Terry sank to
the floor. She rushed up to the place where he was, threw herself upon his
body, made loud exclamations and moans, and commenced inviting the spectators
to avenge her wrong upon Field and Neagle. She
appeared to be carried away by passion, and in a very earnest manner charged
that Field and Neagle had murdered her husband
intentionally, and shortly afterwards she appealed to the persons present to
examine the body of Terry to see that he had no weapons. This she did once or
twice. The satchel which she had, being taken from her, was found to contain a
revolver.
These
are the material circumstances produced in evidence before the Circuit Court on
the hearing, of this habeas corpus case. It is but a short sketch of a history
which is given in over five hundred pages in the record, but we think it is
sufficient to enable us to apply the law of the case to the question before us.
Without a more minute discussion of this testimony, it produces upon us the
conviction of a settled purpose on the part of Terry and his wife, amounting to
a conspiracy, to murder Justice Field. And we are quite sure that, if Neagle had been merely a brother or a friend of Judge
Field, traveling with him, and aware of all the previous relations of Terry to
the Judge -- as he was -- of his bitter animosity, his
declared purpose to have revenge even to the point [135 U. S. 54] of killing him, he would
have been justified in what he did in defence of Mr.
Justice Field's life, and possibly of his own.
But
such a justification would be a proper subject for consideration on a trial of
the case for murder in the courts of the State of California, and there exists
no authority in the courts of the United States to discharge the prisoner while
held in custody by the State authorities for this offence unless there be found
in aid of the defence of the prisoner some element of
power and authority asserted under the government of the United States.
This
element is said to be found in the facts that Mr. Justice Field, when attacked,
was in the immediate discharge of his duty as judge of the Circuit Courts of
the United States within California; that the assault upon him grew out of the
animosity of Terry and wife, arising out of the previous discharge of his duty
as circuit justice in the case for which they were committed for contempt of
court, and that the deputy marshal of the United States, who killed Terry in defence of Field's life, was charged with a duty under the
law of the United States to protect Field from the violence which Terry was
inflicting, and which was intended to lead to Field's death.
To
the inquiry whether this proposition is sustained by law and the facts which we
have recited we now address ourselves.
Mr.
Justice Field was a member of the Supreme Court of the United States, and had
been a member of that court for over a quarter of a century, during which he
had become venerable for his age and for his long and valuable service in that
court. The business of the Supreme Court has become so exacting that for many
years past, the justices of it have been compelled to remain for the larger
part of the year in Washington City, from whatever part of the country they may
have been appointed. The term for each year, including the necessary travel and
preparations to attend at its beginning, has generally lasted from eight to
nine months.
But
the justices of this court have imposed upon them other duties, the most
important of which arise out of the fact that they are also judges of the
Circuit Courts of the United States.
[135 U. S. 55] Of these circuits there are nine, to each one of which a justice
of the Supreme Court is allotted, under section 606 of the Revised Statutes,
the provision of which is as follows:
"The
chief justice and associate justices of the Supreme Court shall be allotted
among the circuits by an order of the court, and a new allotment shall be made
whenever it becomes necessary or convenient by reason of the alteration of any
circuit, or of the new appointment of a chief justice or associate justice, or otherwise."
Section
610 declares that it
"shall be the duty of the chief justice, and of each justice
of the Supreme Court, to attend at least one term of the Circuit Court, in each
district of the circuit to which he is allotted during every period of two years."
Although
this enactment does not require in terms that the justices shall go to their
circuits more than once in two years, the effect of it is to compel most of
them to do this, because there are so many districts in many of the circuits
that it is impossible for the circuit justice to reach them all in one year,
and the result of this is that he goes to some of them in one year, and to
others in the next year, thus requiring an attendance in the circuit every
year.
The
justices of the Supreme Court have been members of the Circuit Courts of the
United States ever since the organization of the government,
and their attendance on the circuit and appearance at the places where the
courts are held has always been thought to be a matter of importance. In order
to enable him to perform this duty, Mr. Justice Field had to travel each year
from Washington City, near the Atlantic coast, to San Francisco, on the Pacific
coast. In doing this, he was as much in the discharge of a duty imposed upon
him by law as he was while sitting in court and trying causes. There are many
duties which the judge performs outside of the courtroom where he sits to
pronounce judgment or to preside over a trial. The statutes of the United
States, and the established practice of the courts, require that the judge
perform a very large share of his judicial labors at what is called
"chambers." This chamber work is as important as necessary, as much a
discharge of his official duty as that performed [135 U. S. 56] in the courthouse. Important
cases are often argued before the judge at any place convenient to the parties
concerned, and a decision of the judge is arrived at by investigations made in
his own room, wherever he may be, and it is idle to say that this is not as
much the performance of judicial duty as the filing of the judgment with the
clerk and the announcement of the result in open court.
So
it is impossible for a justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, who
is compelled by the obligations of duty to be so much in Washington City, to
discharge his duties of attendance on the Circuit Courts as prescribed by
section 610 without traveling in the usual and most convenient modes of doing
it to the place where the court is to be held. This duty is as much an
obligation imposed by the law as if it had said in words "the Justices of
the Supreme Court shall go from Washington City to the place where their terms
are held every year."
Justice
Field had not only left Washington and traveled the three thousand miles or
more which were necessary to reach his circuit, but he had entered upon the
duties of that circuit, had held the court at San Francisco for some time; and,
taking a short leave of that court, had gone down to Los Angeles, another place
where a court was to be held, and sat as a judge there for several days,
hearing cases and rendering decisions. It was in the necessary act of returning
from Los Angeles to San Francisco, by the usual mode of travel between the two
places, where his court was still in session, and where he was required to be,
that he was assaulted by Terry in the manner which we have already described.
The
occurrence which we are called upon to consider was of so extraordinary a
character that it is not to be expected that many cases can be found to cite as
authority upon the subject.
In the case of United
States v. The Schooner Little Charles, 1 Brock. 380, 382, a question
arose before Chief Justice Marshall, holding the Circuit Court of the United
States for Virginia, as to the validity of an order made by the District Judge
at his chambers, and not in court. The act of Congress authorized stated terms
of the District Court, and gave the judge [135 U. S. 57] power to hold special
courts at his discretion, either at the place appointed by the law or such
other place in the district as the nature of the business and his discretion
should direct. He says:
"It
does not seem to be a violent construction of such an act to consider the judge
as constituting a court whenever he proceeds on judicial business;"
and cites the practice of the courts in support of that view of the
subject.
In the case of United
States v. Gleason, 1 Wool.C.C. 128, 132, the prisoner was indicted for the murder of two
enrolling officers who were charged with the duty of arresting deserters, or
those who had been drafted into the service and had failed to attend. These
men, it was said, had visited the region of country where they were murdered,
and, having failed of accomplishing their purpose of arresting the deserters,
were on their return to their home when they were killed, and the court was
asked to instruct the jury that, under these circumstances, they were not
engaged in the duty of arresting the deserters named. "It is claimed by
the counsel for the defendant," says the report,
"that,
if the parties killed had been so engaged, and had come to that neighborhood
with the purpose of arresting the supposed deserters, but at the moment of the
assault had abandoned the purpose of making the arrests at that time, and were
returning to headquarters at Grinnell with a view to making other arrangements
for arrest at another time, they were not so engaged as to bring the case
within the law."
But
the court held that this was not a sound construction of the statute, and
"that,
if the parties killed had come into that neighborhood with intent to arrest the
deserters named, and had been employed by the proper officer for that service,
and were in the proper prosecution of that purpose, returning to Grinnell with
a view to making other arrangements to discharge this duty, they were still
engaged in arresting the deserters within the meaning of the statute. It is not
necessary," said the court, “that the party killed should be engaged in
the immediate act of arrest, but it is sufficient if he be employed in and
about that business when assaulted. The purpose of the law is to protect the
life of the person so employed, and this protection continues so [135 U. S.
58] long as he is engaged in a
service necessary and proper to that employment."
We
have no doubt that Mr. Justice Field, when attacked by Terry, was engaged in
the discharge of his duties as Circuit Justice of the Ninth Circuit, and was
entitled to all the protection under those circumstances which the law could
give him.
It
is urged, however, that there exists no statute authorizing any such protection
as that which Neagle was instructed to give Judge
Field in the present case, and indeed no protection whatever against a
vindictive or malicious assault growing out of the faithful discharge of his
official duties, and that the language of section 753 of the Revised Statutes,
that the party seeking the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus must in this
connection show that he is "in custody for an act done or omitted in
pursuance of a law of the United States," makes it necessary that, upon
this occasion, it should be shown that the act for which Neagle
is imprisoned as done by virtue of an act of Congress. It is not supposed that
any special act of Congress exists which authorizes the marshals or deputy
marshals of the United States in express terms to accompany the judges of the
Supreme Court through their circuits, and act as a bodyguard to them, to defend
them against malicious assaults against their persons. But we are of opinion
that this view of the statute is an unwarranted restriction of the meaning of a
law designed to extend in a liberal manner the benefit of the writ of habeas
corpus to persons imprisoned for the performance of their duty. And we are
satisfied that, if it was the duty of Neagle, under
the circumstances, a duty which could only arise under the laws of the United
States, to defend Mr. Justice Field from a murderous attack upon him, he brings
himself within the meaning of the section we have recited. This view of the
subject is confirmed by the alternative provision, that
he must be in custody
"for
an act done or omitted in pursuance of a law of the United States or of an
order, process, or decree of a court or judge thereof, or is in custody in
violation of the Constitution or of a law or treaty of the United States."
[135 U. S. 59] In the view we take of the Constitution of the United States, any
obligation fairly and properly inferrible from that
instrument, or any duty of the marshal to be derived from the general scope of
his duties under the laws of the United States, is "a law" within the
meaning of this phrase. It would be a great reproach to the system of
government of the United States, declared to be within its sphere sovereign and
supreme, if there is to be found within the domain of its powers no means of
protecting the judges, in the conscientious and faithful discharge of their
duties, from the malice and hatred of those upon whom their judgments may
operate unfavorably.
It
has in modern times become apparent that the physical health of the community
is more efficiently promoted by hygienic and preventive means than by the skill
which is applied to the cure of disease after it has become fully developed. So
also the law, which is intended to prevent crime, in its general spread among
the community, by regulations, police organization, and otherwise, which are
adapted for the protection of the lives and property of citizens, for the
dispersion of mobs, for the arrest of thieves and assassins, for the watch
which is kept over the community, as well as over this class of people, is more
efficient than punishment of crimes after they have been committed.
If
a person in the situation of Judge Field could have no other guarantee of his
personal safety, while engaged in the conscientious discharge of a disagreeable
duty, than the fact that, if he was murdered, his murderer would be subject to
the laws of a State, and by those laws could be punished, the security would be
very insufficient. The plan which Terry and wife had in mind of insulting him
and assaulting him and drawing him into a defensive physical contest, in the
course of which they would slay him, shows the little value of such remedies.
We do not believe that the government of the United States is thus inefficient,
or that its Constitution and laws have left the high officers of the government
so defenceless and unprotected.
The
views expressed by this court through Mr. Justice [135 U. S. 60] Bradley, in Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371, 100 U. S. 394,
are very pertinent to this subject, and express our views with great force.
That was a case of a writ of habeas corpus, where Siebold
had been indicted in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of
Maryland for an offence committed against the election laws during an election
at which members of Congress and officers of the State of Maryland were
elected. He was convicted, and sentenced to fine and imprisonment, and filed
his petition in this court for a writ of habeas corpus to be relieved on the
ground that the court which had convicted him was without jurisdiction. The
foundation of this allegation was that the Congress of the United States had no
right to prescribe laws for the conduct of the election in question, or for
enforcing the laws of the State of Maryland by the courts of the United States.
In the course of the discussion of the relative powers of the federal and state
courts on this subject, it is said:
"Somewhat
akin to the argument which has been considered is the objection that the deputy
marshals authorized by the act of Congress to be created and to attend the
elections are authorized to keep the peace, and that this is a duty which
belongs to the state authorities alone. It is argued that the preservation of
peace and good order in society is not within the powers confided to the
government of the United States, but belongs exclusively to the States. Here
again we are met with the theory that the government of the United States does
not rest upon the soil and territory of the country. We think that this theory
is founded on an entire misconception of the nature and powers of that
government. We hold it to be an incontrovertible principle that the government
of the United States may, by means of physical force, exercised through its
official agents, execute on every foot of American soil the powers and
functions that belong to it. This necessarily involves the power to command
obedience to its laws, and hence the power to keep the peace to that extent.
This power to enforce its laws and to execute its functions in all places does
not derogate from the power of the State to execute its laws at the same time
and in the same [135 U. S. 61] places. The one does not exclude the other, except where both
cannot be executed at the same time. In that case, the words of the
Constitution itself show which is to yield. 'This Constitution, and all laws
which shall be made in pursuance thereof, . . . shall
be the supreme law of the land.' . . . Without the concurrent sovereignty
referred to, the national government would be nothing but an advisory
government. Its executive power would be absolutely nullified. Why do we have
marshals at all if they cannot physically lay their hands on persons and things
in the performance of their proper duties? What functions can they perform if
they cannot use force? In executing the processes of the courts, must they call
on the nearest constable for protection? must they
rely on him to use the requisite compulsion, and to keep the peace, whilst they
are soliciting and entreating the parties and bystanders to allow the law to
take its course? This is the necessary consequence of the positions that are
assumed. If we indulge in such impracticable views as these, and keep on
refining and re-refining, we shall drive the national government out of the
United States, and relegate it to the District of Columbia, or perhaps to some
foreign soil. We shall bring it back to a condition of greater helplessness
than that of the old confederation. . . . It must execute its powers, or it is
no government. It must execute them on the land as well as on the sea, on
things as well as on persons. And, to do this, it must necessarily have power
to command obedience, preserve order, and keep the peace, and no person or
power in this land has the right to resist or question its authority so long as
it keeps within the bounds of its jurisdiction."
At
the same term of the court, in the case of Tennessee
v. Davis, 100 U. S. 257, 100 U. S. 262,
where the same questions in regard to the relative powers of the federal and
state courts were concerned, in regard to criminal offences, the court
expressed its views through Mr. Justice Strong, quoting from the case of Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 363, the following language:
"The general government must cease to exist whenever it loses the power of
protecting itself in the exercise of its Constitutional [135 U. S. 62] powers," and then
proceeding:
"It
can act only through its officers and agents, and they must act within the
States. If, when thus acting, and within the scope of their authority, those
officers can be arrested and brought to trial in a state court, for an alleged
offence against the law of the State, yet warranted by the federal authority
they possess, and if the general government is powerless to interfere at once
for their protection -- if their protection must be left to the action of the
state court -- the operations of the general government may at any time be
arrested at the will of one of its members. The legislation of a State may be
unfriendly. It may affix penalties to acts done under the immediate direction
of the national government, and in obedience to its laws. It may deny the
authority conferred by those laws. The state court may administer not only the
laws of the State, but equally federal law, in such a manner as to paralyze the
operations of the government. And even if, after trial and final judgment in
the state court, the case can be brought into the United States court for
review, the officer is withdrawn from the discharge of his duty during the
pendency of the prosecution, and the exercise of acknowledged federal power
arrested. We do not think such an element of weakness is to be found in the
Constitution. The United States is a government with authority extending over
the whole territory of the Union, acting upon the States and the people of the
States. While it is limited in the number of its powers, so far as its
sovereignty extends, it is supreme. No state government can exclude it from the
exercise of any authority conferred upon it by the Constitution, obstruct its
authorized officers against its will, or withhold from it for a moment the
cognizance of any subject which that instrument has committed to it."
To
cite all the cases in which this principle of the supremacy of the government
of the United States, in the exercise of all the powers conferred upon it by
the Constitution, is maintained would be an endless task. We have selected
these as being the most forcible expressions of the views of the court having a
direct reference to the nature of the case before us.
Where,
then, are we to look for the protection which we [135 U. S. 63] have shown Judge Field was
entitled to when engaged in the discharge of his official duties? Not to the
courts of the United States, because, as has been more than once said in this
court, in the division of the powers of government between the three great
departments, executive, legislative and judicial, the judicial is the weakest
for the purposes of self-protection and for the enforcement of the powers which
it exercises. The ministerial officers through whom its commands must be
executed are marshals of the United States, and belong emphatically to the
executive department of the government. They are appointed by the President,
with the advice and consent of the Senate. They are removable from office at
his pleasure. They are subjected by act of Congress to the supervision and
control of the Department of Justice, in the hands of one of the cabinet
officers of the President, and their compensation is provided by acts of
Congress. The same may be said of the district attorneys of the United States,
who prosecute and defend the claims of the government in the courts.
The
legislative branch of the government can only protect the judicial officers by
the enactment of laws for that purpose, and the argument we are now combating
assumes that no such law has been passed by Congress.
If
we turn to the executive department of the government, we find a very different
condition of affairs. The Constitution, section 3, Article 2, declares that the
President "shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed," and
he is provided with the means of fulfilling this obligation by his authority to
commission all the officers of the United States, and, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate, to appoint the most important of them and to fill
vacancies. He is declared to be commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the
United States. The duties which are thus imposed upon him he is further enabled
to perform by the recognition in the Constitution, and the creation by acts of
Congress, of executive departments, which have varied in number from four or
five to seven or eight, the heads of which are familiarly called cabinet
ministers. These aid him in the performance of the [135 U. S. 64] great duties of his
office, and represent him in a thousand acts to which it can hardly be supposed
his personal attention is called, and thus he is enabled to fulfill the duty of
his great department, expressed in the phrase that "he shall take care
that the laws be faithfully executed."
Is
this duty limited to the enforcement of acts of Congress or of treaties of the
United States according to their express
terms, or does it
include the rights, duties and obligations growing out of the Constitution
itself, our international relations, and all the protection implied by the
nature of the government under the Constitution?
One
of the most remarkable episodes in the history of our foreign relations, and
which has become an attractive historical incident, is the case of Martin Koszta, a native of Hungary, who, though not fully a
naturalized citizen of the United States, had in due form of law made his
declaration of intention to become a citizen. While in
Smyrna, he was seized by command of the Austrian consul general at that place,
and carried on board the Hussar, an Austrian vessel, where he was held in close
confinement. Captain Ingraham, in command of the American sloop of war
St. Louis, arriving in port at that critical period, and ascertaining that Koszta had with him his naturalization papers, demanded his
surrender to him, and was compelled to train his guns upon the Austrian vessel
before his demands were complied with. It was, however, to prevent bloodshed,
agreed that Koszta should be placed in the hands of
the French consul subject to the result of diplomatic negotiations between
Austria and the United States. The celebrated correspondence between Mr. Marcy,
Secretary of State, and Chevalier Hulsemann, the
Austrian minister at Washington, which arose out of this affair and resulted in
the release and restoration to liberty of Koszta,
attracted a great deal of public attention, and the position assumed by Mr.
Marcy met the approval of the country and of Congress, who voted a gold medal
to Captain Ingraham for his conduct in the affair. Upon what act of Congress
then existing can anyone lay his finger in support of
the action of our government in this matter?
[135 U. S. 65] So, if the President or the Postmaster General is advised that the
mails of the United States, possibly carrying treasure, are liable to be robbed
and the mail carriers assaulted and murdered in any particular region of
country, who can doubt the authority of the President or of one of the
executive departments under him to make an order for the protection of the mail
and of the persons and lives of its carriers, by doing exactly what was done in
the case of Mr. Justice Field, namely, providing a sufficient guard, whether it
be by soldiers of the army or by marshals of the United States, with aposse comitatus properly armed and equipped, to secure
the safe performance of the duty of carrying the mail wherever it may be
intended to go?
The
United States is the owner of millions of acres of valuable public land, and
has been the owner of much more which it has sold. Some of these lands owe a
large part of their value to the forests which grow upon them. These forests
are liable to depredations by people living in the neighborhood, known as
timber thieves, who make a living by cutting and selling such timber, and who
are trespassers. But until quite recently, even if there be one now, there was
no statute authorizing any preventive measures for the protection of this
valuable public property. Has the President no authority to place guards upon
the public territory to protect its timber? No authority to seize the timber
when cut and found upon the ground? Has he no power to take any measures to
protect this vast domain? Fortunately we find this question answered by this
court in the case of Wells
v. Nickles, 104 U. S. 444.
That was a case in which a class of men appointed by local land officers, under
instructions from the Secretary of the Interior, having found a large quantity
of this timber cut down from the forests of the United States and lying where
it was cut, seized it. The question of the title to this property coming in
controversy between Wells and Nickles, it became
essential to inquire into the authority of these timber agents of the
government thus to seize the timber cut by trespassers on its lands. The court
said:
"The
effort we have made to ascertain and fix the authority of these timber agents
by any [135 U. S. 66] positive provision of law
has been unsuccessful."
But
the court, notwithstanding there was no special statute for it, held that the
Department of the Interior, acting under the idea of protecting from
depredation timber on the lands of the government, had gradually come to assert
the right to seize what is cut and taken away from them wherever it can be
traced, and in aid of this, the registers and receivers of the Land Office had,
by instructions from the Secretary of the Interior, been constituted agents of
the United States for these purposes, with power to appoint special agents
under themselves. And the court upheld the authority of the Secretary of the
Interior to make these rules and regulations for the protection of the public
lands.
One
of the cases in this court in which this question was presented in the most
imposing form is that of United
States v. San Jacinto Tin Company, 125 U. S. 273, 125 U. S. 279, 125 U. S. 280.
In that case, a suit was brought in the name of the United States, by order of
the Attorney General, to set aside a patent which had been issued for a large
body of valuable land on the ground that it was obtained from the government by
fraud and deceit practised upon its officers. A
preliminary question was raised by counsel for defendant, which was earnestly
insisted upon, as to the right of the Attorney General or any other officer of
the government to institute such a suit in the absence of any act of Congress
authorizing it. It was conceded that there was no express authority given to
the Attorney General to institute that particular suit or any suit of that
class. The question was one of very great interest, and was very ably argued
both in the court below and in this court. The response of this Court to that
suggestion conceded that, in the acts of Congress establishing the Department
of Justice and defining the duties of the Attorney General, there was no such
express authority, and it was said that there was also no express authority to
him to bring suits against debtors of the government upon bonds, or to begin
criminal prosecutions, or to institute criminal proceedings in any of the cases
in which the United States was plaintiff, yet he was invested with the general
superintendence of all such suits. It was further said:
[135 U. S. 67] "If the United States, in any particular case, has a just
cause for calling upon the judiciary of the country, in any of its Courts, for
relief by setting aside or annulling any of its contracts, its obligations, or
its most solemn instruments, the question of the appeal to the judicial
tribunals of the country must primarily be decided by the Attorney General of
the United States. That such a power should exist somewhere, and that the
United States should not be more helpless in relieving itself of frauds,
impostures, and deceptions than the private individual is hardly open to
argument. . . . There must, then, be an officer or officers of the government
to determine when the United States shall sue, to decide for what it shall sue,
and to be responsible that such suits shall be brought in appropriate cases.
The attorneys of the United States in every judicial district are officers of
this character, and they are by statute under the immediate supervision and
control of the Attorney General. How, then, can it be argued that, if the
United States has been deceived, entrapped, or defrauded into the making, under
the forms of law, of an instrument which injuriously affects its rights of
property, or other rights, it cannot bring a suit to avoid the effect of such
instrument, thus fraudulently obtained, without a special act of Congress in
each case, or without some special authority applicable to this class of
cases?"
The
same question was raised in the earlier case of United States v.
Hughes, 11
How. 552, and decided the same way.
We
cannot doubt the power of the President to take measures for the protection of
a judge of one of the courts of the United States who, while in the discharge
of the duties of his office, is threatened with a personal attack which may
probably result in his death, and we think it clear that, where this protection
is to be afforded through the civil power, the Department of Justice is the
proper one to set in motion the necessary means of protection. The
correspondence already recited in this opinion between the marshal of the
Northern District of California and the Attorney General, and the district
attorney of the United States for that district, although prescribing no very
specific mode of affording this [135 U. S. 68] protection by the Attorney
General, is sufficient, we think, to warrant the marshal in taking the steps
which he did take, in making the provisions which he did make, for the
protection and defence of Mr. Justice Field.
* * * *
We therefore affirm the judgment of the circuit court authorizing
his discharge from the custody of the sheriff of San Joaquin county.
FIELD,
J., did not sit at the hearing of this case, and took no part in its decision.
MR. JUSTICE LAMAR (with whom concurred MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER)
dissenting.
The
chief justice and myself are unable to assent to the
conclusion reached by the majority of the court.
* * * *
Now we agree, taking the facts of the case as they are shown by
the record, that the personal protection of Mr. Justice Field as a private
citizen, even to the death of Terry, was not only the right, but was also the
duty, of Neagle, and of any other bystander, and we
maintain that for the exercise of that right or duty he is answerable to the
courts of the state of California, and to them alone. But we deny that, upon
the facts of this record, he, as Deputy-Marshal Neagle,
or as Private Citizen Neagle, had any duty imposed on
him by the laws of the United States growing out of the official character of
Judge Field as a circuit justice. We deny that anywhere in this transaction,
accepting throughout the appellee's version of the facts, he occupied in law any
position other than what would have been occupied by any other person who
should have interfered in the same manner, in any other assault of the same
character, between any two other persons in that room. In short, we think that
there was nothing whatever, in fact, of an official character in the
transaction, whatever may have been the appellee's view of his alleged official
duties and powers, and therefore we think that the courts of the United States
have, in the present state of our legislation, no jurisdiction whatever in the
premises, and that the appellee should have been remanded to the custody of the
sheriff.
The
contention of the appellee, however, is that it was his official duty, as
United States marshal, to protect the justice; and that, for so doing, in
discharge of this duty, "which could only arise under the laws of the
United States," his detention by the state courts brings the case within
section 753 of the Revised Statutes, as aforesaid.
We
shall therefore address ourselves, as briefly as is consistent with the gravity
of the question involved, to a consideration of the justice of that claim. We
must, however, call attention again to the formal and deliberate admission that
it is not pretended that there is any single specific statute making it, in so many
words, Neagle's duty to protect the justice. The
position assumed is, and is wholly, that the authority [135 U. S. 81] and duty to protect the
justice did arise directly and necessarily out of the Constitution and positive
Congressional enactments.
The
Attorney General of the United States has appeared in this case for the
appellee, in behalf of the government, and, in order that the grounds upon
which the government relies in support of its claim against the state of
California, that Neagle should be discharged on this
writ, may fully appear, it is proper to give some of his most important
propositions in his own language. He maintains that
"it was the duty of the judiciary, having been thus protected
by the executive department, to sit in judgment upon and to vindicate the
officer of the executive department, if innocent, in the discharge of his duty,
because such authority in the federal judiciary is essential, in principle, to
the existence of the nation. . . . We insist that, by the Constitution of the
United States, a government was created possessed of all the powers necessary
to existence as an independent nation; that these powers were distributed in
three great Constitutional departments; and that each of these departments is
by that Constitution invested with all of those governmental powers naturally
belonging to such department which have not been expressly withheld by the
terms of the Constitution. In other words, that Congress is invested not only
with expressed, but with implied, legislative powers; that the judiciary is
invested not only with express powers granted in the Constitution as its share
of the government, but with all the judicial powers which have not been
expressly withheld from it; and that the President, in like manner, by the very
fact that he is made the chief executive of the nation, and is charged to
protect, preserve, and defend the Constitution, and to take care that the laws
are faithfully executed, is invested with necessary and implied executive powers
which neither of the other branches of the government can either take away or
abridge; that many of these powers, pertaining to each branch of the
government, are self-executing, and in no way dependent, except as to the ways
and means, upon legislation."
"The
Constitution provides that, before the President enters [135 U. S. 82] upon the execution of his
office, he shall take an oath:"
"I
do solemnly swear that I will faithfully execute the office of President of the
United States, and will, to the best of my ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United
States."
And
he asks:
"Has
this clause no significance? Does it not, by necessary implication, invest the
President with self-executing powers, that is, powers independent of statute?"
In
reply to these propositions, we have this to say: we recognize that the powers
of the government, "within its sphere," as defined by the
Constitution and interpreted by the well-settled principles which have resulted
from a century of wise and patriotic analysis, are supreme; that these supreme
powers extend to the protection of itself and all of its agencies, as well as
to the preservation and the perpetuation of its usefulness; and that these
powers may be found not only in the express authorities conferred by the
Constitution, but also in necessary and proper implications. But, while that is
all true, it is also true that the powers must be exercised not only by the
organs, but also in conformity with the modes, prescribed by the Constitution itself.
These great federal powers, whose existence in all their plenitude and energy
is incontestable, are not autocratic and lawless. They are organized powers
committed by the people to the hands of their servants for their own government
and distributed among the legislative, executive, and judicial departments.
They are not extra the Constitution, for, in and by that
Constitution, and in and by it alone, the United States, as a great,
democratic, federal republic, was called into existence, and finds its continued
existence possible. In that instrument is found not only the answer to the
general line of argument pursued in this case, but also to the specific
question propounded by the attorney general in respect to the President's oath
and its implications.
The
President is sworn to "preserve, protect, and defend the
Constitution." That oath has great significance. The sections which
follow that prescribing the oath (sections 2 and 3 of article 2) prescribe the
duties and fix the powers of the President. But one very prominent feature of
the Constitution [135 U. S. 83] which he is sworn to preserve, and which the whole body of the
judiciary are bound to enforce, is the closing paragraph of section 8, art. 1,
in which it is declared that "the Congress shall have power . . . to make
all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the
foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the
government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof."
This
clause is that which contains the germ of all the implication of powers under
the Constitution. It is that which has built up the Congress of the United
States into the most august and imposing legislative assembly in the world, and
which has secured vigor to the practical operations of the government, and at
the same time tended largely to preserve the equilibrium of its various powers
among its coordinate departments, as partitioned by that instrument. And that
clause alone conclusively refutes the assertion of the attorney general that it
was "the duty of the executive department of the United States to guard
and protect at any hazard the life of Mr. Justice Field in the discharge of his
duty, because such protection is essential to the existence of the
government."
Waiving
the question of the essentiality of any such protection to the existence of the
government, the manifest answer is that the protection needed and to be given
must proceed not from the President, but primarily from Congress. Again, while
it is the President's duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed,
it is not his duty to make laws or a law of the United States. The laws he is
to see executed are manifestly those contained in the Constitution and those
enacted by Congress, whose duty it is to make all laws necessary and proper for
carrying into execution the powers of those tribunals. In fact, for the
President to have undertaken to make any law of the United States pertinent to
this matter would have been to invade the domain of power expressly committed
by the Constitution exclusively to Congress. That body was perfectly able to
pass such laws as it should deem expedient in reference to such matter. Indeed,
it has passed such laws in reference to [135 U. S. 84] elections, expressly
directing the United States Marshals to attend places of election, to act as peace
officers, to arrest with and without process, and to protect the supervisors of
election in the discharge of their duties; and there was not the slightest
legal necessity out of which to imply any such power in the President. For
these reasons, the letters of the attorney general to Marshal Franks, granting
that they did import what is claimed, and granting that the attorney general
was to all intents and purposes, pro
hac vice, the President, invested Neagle with no special powers whatever. They were, if so
construed, without authority of law; and Neagle was
then and there a simple deputy marshal, no more and no less.
* * * *