SOUTH CAROLINA v. KATZENBACH
383 U.S. 301 (1966)
ON
BILL OF COMPLAINT.
No. 22, Orig.
Argued January 17-18, 1966.
Decided March 7, 1966.
Invoking the Court's
original jurisdiction under Art. III, 2, of the Constitution, South Carolina
filed a bill of complaint seeking a declaration of unconstitutionality as to
certain provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and an injunction against
their enforcement by defendant, the Attorney General. The Act's key features,
aimed at areas where voting discrimination has been most flagrant, are: (1) A
coverage formula or "triggering mechanism" in 4(b) determining applicability of its
substantive provisions; (2) provision in §4(a) for temporary suspension of a
State's voting tests or devices; (3) procedure in §5 for review of new voting
rules; and (4) a program in §§6(b), 7, 9, and 13 (a) for using federal
examiners to qualify applicants for registration who are thereafter entitled to
vote in all elections. These remedial sections automatically apply to any State
or its subdivision which the Attorney General has determined maintained on
November 1, 1964, a registration or voting "test or device" (a
literacy, educational, character, or voucher requirement as defined in §4(c))
and in which according to the Census Director's determination less than half
the voting-age residents were registered or voted in the 1964 presidential
election. Statutory coverage may be terminated by a declaratory judgment of a
three-judge District of Columbia District Court that for the preceding five
years racially discriminatory voting tests or devices have not been used. No
person in a covered area may be denied voting rights because of failure to
comply with a test or device. §4(a). Following administrative determinations,
enforcement was temporarily suspended of South Carolina's literacy test as well
as of tests and devices in certain other areas. The Act further provides in §5
that during the suspension period, a State or subdivision may not apply new
voting rules unless the Attorney General has interposed no objection within 60
days of their submission to him, or a three-judge District of Columbia District
Court has issued a declaratory judgment that such rules are not racially
discriminatory. South Carolina wishes to apply a recent amendment to its voting
laws without following these procedures. In [383 U.S. 301, 302] any
political subdivision where tests or devices have been suspended, the Civil
Service Commission shall appoint voting examiners whenever the Attorney General
has, after considering specified factors, duly certified receiving complaints
of official racial voting discrimination from at least 20 residents or that the
examiners' appointment is otherwise necessary under the Fifteenth Amendment.
§6(b). Examiners are to transmit to the appropriate officials the names of
applicants they find qualified; and such persons may vote in any election after
45 days following transmission of their names. §7(b). Removal by the examiners
of names from voting lists is provided on loss of eligibility or on successful
challenge under prescribed procedures. §7(d). The use of examiners is
terminated if requested by the Attorney General or the political subdivision
has obtained a declaratory judgment as specified in §13(a). Following
certification by the Attorney General, federal examiners were appointed in two
South Carolina counties as well as elsewhere in other States. Subsidiary cures
for persistent voting discrimination and other special provisions are also
contained in the Act. In addition to a general assault on the Act as
unconstitutionally encroaching on States' rights, specific constitutional
challenges by plaintiff and certain amici curiae are: The coverage formula
violates the principle of equality between the States, denies due process
through an invalid presumption, bars judicial review of administrative
findings, is a bill of attainder, and legislatively adjudicates guilt; the
review of new voting rules infringes Art. III by directing the District Court
to issue advisory opinions; the assignment of federal examiners violates due
process by foreclosing judicial review of administrative findings and impairs
the separation of powers by giving the Attorney General judicial functions; the
challenge procedure denies due process on account of its speed; and provisions
for adjudication in the District of Columbia abridge due process by limiting
litigation to a distant forum.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered
the opinion of the Court.
By leave of the Court, 382 U.S. 898 , South Carolina has filed a bill of complaint, seeking a declaration that selected provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 19651 violate the Federal Constitution, and asking for an injunction against enforcement of these provisions by the Attorney General. Original jurisdiction is founded on the presence of a controversy between a State and a citizen of another State under Art. III, §2, of the Constitution. See Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U.S. 439 . Because no issues of fact were raised in the complaint, and because of South Carolina's desire to obtain a ruling prior to its primary elections in June 1966, we dispensed with appointment of a special master and expedited our hearing of the case.
Recognizing that the questions presented were of urgent concern to the entire country, we invited all of the States to participate in this proceeding as friends of the Court. A majority responded by submitting or joining in briefs on the merits, some supporting South Carolina and others the Attorney General. Seven of these States [383 U.S. 301, 308] also requested and received permission to argue the case orally at our hearing. Without exception despite the emotional overtones of the proceeding, the briefs and oral arguments were temperate, lawyerlike and constructive. All viewpoints on the issues have been fully developed, and this additional assistance has been most helpful to the Court.
The Voting Rights Act was designed by Congress to banish the blight of racial discrimination in voting, which has infected the electoral process in parts of our country for nearly a century. The Act creates stringent new remedies for voting discrimination where it persists on a pervasive scale, and in addition the statute strengthens existing remedies for pockets of voting discrimination elsewhere in the country. Congress assumed the power to prescribe these remedies from Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, which authorizes the National Legislature to effectuate by "appropriate" measures the constitutional prohibition against racial discrimination in voting. We hold that the sections of the Act which are properly before us are an appropriate means for carrying out Congress' constitutional responsibilities and are consonant with all other provisions of the Constitution. We therefore deny South Carolina's request that enforcement of these sections of the Act be enjoined.
I.
The constitutional propriety of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 must be judged with reference to the historical experience which it reflects. Before enacting the measure, Congress explored with great care the problem of racial discrimination in voting. The House and Senate Committees on the Judiciary each held hearings for nine days and received testimony from a total of 67 witnesses.3 [383 U.S. 301, 309] More than three full days were consumed discussing the bill on the floor of the House, while the debate in the Senate covered 26 days in all.4 At the close of these deliberations, the verdict of both chambers was overwhelming. The House approved the bill by a vote of 328-74, and the measure passed the Senate by a margin of 79-18.
Two points emerge vividly from the voluminous legislative history of the Act contained in the committee hearings and floor debates. First: Congress felt itself confronted by an insidious and pervasive evil which had been perpetuated in certain parts of our country through unremitting and ingenious defiance of the Constitution. Second: Congress concluded that the unsuccessful remedies which it had prescribed in the past would have to be replaced by sterner and more elaborate measures in order to satisfy the clear commands of the Fifteenth Amendment. We pause here to summarize the majority reports of the House and Senate Committees, which document in considerable detail the factual basis for these reactions by Congress.5 See H. R. Rep. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 8-16 (hereinafter cited as House Report); S. Rep. No. 162, pt. 3, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 3-16 (hereinafter cited as Senate Report). [383 U.S. 301, 310]
* * *
II.
The Voting Rights Act
of 1965 reflects Congress' firm intention to rid the country of racial
discrimination in voting. The heart of the Act is a complex scheme of
stringent remedies aimed at areas where voting discrimination has been most
flagrant. Section [§] 4 (a)-(d) lays down a formula defining the States and
political subdivisions to which these new remedies apply. The first of the
remedies, contained in Section 4 (a), is the suspension of literacy tests and
similar voting qualifications for a period of five years from the last
occurrence of substantial voting discrimination. Section 5 prescribes a second [383 U.S. 301, 316] remedy,
the suspension of all new voting regulations pending review by federal
authorities to determine whether their use would perpetuate voting
discrimination. The third remedy, covered in §§6 (b), 7, 9, and 13 (a), is the
assignment of federal examiners on certification by the Attorney General to
list qualified applicants who are thereafter entitled to vote in all elections.
Other provisions of
the Act prescribe subsidiary cures for persistent voting discrimination.
Section 8 authorizes the appointment of federal poll-watchers in places to
which federal examiners have already been assigned. Section 10 (d) excuses
those made eligible to vote in sections of the country covered by Section 4 (b)
of the Act from paying accumulated past poll taxes for state and local
elections. Section 12 (e) provides for balloting by persons denied access to
the polls in areas where federal examiners have been appointed.
The remaining
remedial portions of the Act are aimed at voting discrimination in any area of
the country where it may occur. Section 2 broadly prohibits the use of voting
rules to abridge exercise of the franchise on racial grounds. Sections 3, 6
(a), and 13 (b) strengthen existing procedures for attacking voting
discrimination by means of litigation. Section 4 (e) excuses citizens educated
in American schools conducted in a foreign language from passing
English-language literacy tests. Section 10 (a)-(c) facilitates constitutional
litigation challenging the imposition of all poll taxes for state and local
elections. Sections 11 and 12 (a)-(d) authorize civil and criminal sanctions
against interference with the exercise of rights guaranteed by the Act.
* * *
III.
These provisions of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 are challenged on the fundamental ground that
they exceed the powers of Congress and encroach on an area reserved to the
States by the Constitution. South Carolina and certain of the amici curiae also
attack specific sections of the Act for more particular reasons. They argue
that the coverage formula prescribed in §4 (a)-(d) violates the principle of
the equality of States, denies due process by employing an invalid presumption
and by barring judicial review of administrative findings, constitutes a
forbidden bill of attainder, and impairs the separation of powers by
adjudicating guilt through legislation. They claim that the review of new
voting rules required in §5 infringes Article III by directing the District
Court to issue advisory opinions. They contend that the assignment of federal
examiners authorized in §6(b) abridges due process by precluding judicial review
of administrative findings and impairs the separation of powers by giving the
Attorney General judicial functions; also that the challenge procedure
prescribed in §9 denies due process on account of its speed. Finally, South
Carolina and certain of the amici curiae maintain that §§4(a) and 5, buttressed
by §14(b) of the Act, abridge due process by limiting litigation to a distant
forum.
* * *
The ground rules for
resolving this question are clear. The language and purpose of the Fifteenth
Amendment, the prior decisions construing its several provisions, and the
general doctrines of constitutional interpretation, all point to one
fundamental principle. As against the reserved powers of the States, Congress
may use any rational means to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of
racial discrimination in voting. Cf. our rulings last Term, sustaining Title II
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, in Heart
of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241,
258 -259, 261-262; and Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303 -304. We
turn now to a more detailed description of the standards which govern our
review of the Act. [383 U.S. 301, 325]
Section 1 of the
Fifteenth Amendment declares that "[t]he right of citizens of the United
States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any
State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." This
declaration has always been treated as self-executing and has repeatedly been
construed, without further legislative specification, to invalidate state
voting qualifications or procedures which are discriminatory on their face or
in practice. See Neal v. Delaware, 103
U.S. 370 ; Guinn
v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 ; Myers
v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 ; Lane v.
Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 ; Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 ; Schnell v. Davis, 336 U.S. 933 ; Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 ; United
States v. Thomas, 362 U.S. 58 ; Gomillion v. Lightfoot,
364 U.S. 339 ; Alabama v. United States,
371 U.S. 37 ; Louisiana v. United States,
380 U.S. 145 . These decisions have been rendered with full respect for the
general rule, reiterated last Term in Carrington
v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 91 , that States "have
broad powers to determine the conditions under which the right of suffrage may
be exercised." The gist of the matter is that the Fifteenth Amendment
supersedes contrary exertions of state power. "When a State exercises power
wholly within the domain of state interest, it is insulated from federal
judicial review. But such insulation is not carried over when state power is
used as an instrument for circumventing a federally protected right." Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S., at 347 .
South Carolina
contends that the cases cited above are precedents only for the authority of
the judiciary to strike down state statutes and procedures - that to allow an
exercise of this authority by Congress would be to rob the courts of their
rightful constitutional role. On the contrary, Section 2 of the Fifteenth
Amendment expressly declares that "Congress shall have power to enforce
this article by appropriate legislation." By adding this [383 U.S. 301,
326] authorization, the Framers
indicated that Congress was to be chiefly responsible for implementing the rights
created in Section 1. "It is the power of Congress which has been
enlarged. Congress is authorized to enforce the prohibitions by appropriate
legislation. Some legislation is contemplated to make the [Civil War]
amendments fully effective." Ex
parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345. Accordingly, in addition to the courts,
Congress has full remedial powers to effectuate the constitutional prohibition
against racial discrimination in voting.
Congress has
repeatedly exercised these powers in the past, and its enactments have
repeatedly been upheld. For recent examples, see the Civil Rights Act of 1957,
which was sustained in United States v.
Raines, 362 U.S. 17 ; United States v. Thomas, supra; and Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 ; and the
Civil Rights Act of 1960, which was upheld in Alabama v. United States, supra; Louisiana v. United States, supra;
and United States v. Mississippi, 380
U.S. 128 . On the rare occasions when the Court has found an unconstitutional
exercise of these powers, in its opinion Congress had attacked evils not
comprehended by the Fifteenth Amendment. See United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 ; James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127 .
The basic test to be
applied in a case involving Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment is the same as
in all cases concerning the express powers of Congress with relation to the
reserved powers of the States. Chief Justice Marshall laid down the classic
formulation, 50 years before the Fifteenth Amendment was ratified:
"Let the end be legitimate, let it be within
the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the
letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional." McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316,
421. [383 U.S. 301, 327]
The Court has
subsequently echoed his language in describing each of the Civil War
Amendments:
"Whatever legislation is appropriate,
that is, adapted to carry out the objects the amendments have in view, whatever
tends to enforce submission to the prohibitions they contain, and to secure to
all persons the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil rights and the equal
protection of the laws against State denial or invasion, if not prohibited, is
brought within the domain of congressional power." Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S., at 345 -346.
This language was
again employed, nearly 50 years later, with reference to Congress' related
authority under Section 2 of the Eighteenth Amendment. James Everard's Breweries v. Day, 265
U.S. 545, 558 -559.
We therefore reject
South Carolina's argument that Congress may appropriately do no more than to
forbid violations of the Fifteenth Amendment in general terms - that the task
of fashioning specific remedies or of applying them to particular localities
must necessarily be left entirely to the courts. Congress is not circumscribed
by any such artificial rules under Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment. In the
oft-repeated words of Chief Justice Marshall, referring to another specific
legislative authorization in the Constitution, "This power, like all
others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its
utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in
the constitution." Gibbons v. Ogden,
9 Wheat. 1, 196.
* * * *
After enduring nearly
a century of widespread resistance to the Fifteenth Amendment, Congress has
marshaled an array of potent weapons against the evil, with authority in the
Attorney General to employ them effectively. Many of the areas directly
affected by this development have indicated their willingness to abide by any
restraints legitimately imposed upon them.51 We here hold that the
portions of the Voting Rights Act properly before us are a valid means for
carrying out the commands of the Fifteenth Amendment. Hopefully, millions of
non-white Americans will not be able to participate for the first time on an
equal basis in the government under which they live. We may finally look
forward to the day when truly "[t]he right of citizens of the United
States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any
State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."
The bill of complaint is Dismissed.
179 Stat. 437, 42 U.S.C. 1973 (1964 ed.,
Supp. I).
2States supporting South Carolina:
Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Virginia. States supporting the
Attorney General: California, Illinois, and Massachusetts, joined by Hawaii,
Indiana, [383 U.S. 301, 308]
Iowa, Kansas, Maine,
Maryland, Michigan, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
3See Hearings on H. R. 6400 before
Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess. (hereinafter cited as House Hearings); Hearings on S. 1564 before the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (hereinafter cited as
Senate Hearings).
4See the Congressional Record for April
22, 23, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30; May 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19,
20, 21, 24, 25, 26; July 6, 7, 8, 9; August 3 and 4, 1965.
5The facts contained in these reports
are confirmed, among other sources, by United
States v. Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. 353, 363-385 (Wisdom, J.), aff'd, 380 U.S. 145 ;
United States v. Mississippi, 229 F.
Supp. 925, 983-997 (dissenting opinion of Brown, J.), rev'd
and rem'd, 380 U.S. 128 ;
United States v. Alabama, 192 F.
Supp. 677 [383
U.S. 301, 310] (Johnson, J.), aff'd, 304 F.2d 583,
aff'd, 371
U.S. 37 ; Comm'n on Civil Rights, Voting in
Mississippi; 1963 Comm'n on Civil Rights Rep.,
Voting; 1961 Comm'n on Civil Rights Rep., Voting, pt.
2; 1959 Comm'n on Civil Rights Rep., pt. 2. See
generally Christopher, The Constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
18 Stan. L. Rev. 1; Note, Federal Protection of Negro Voting Rights, 51 Va. L.
Rev. 1051.
51See Comm'n on
Civil Rights, The Voting Rights Act (1965).
Mr. Justice Black, concurring and
dissenting.
* * * *
Though, as I have
said, I agree with most of the Court's conclusions, I dissent from its holding
that every part of 5 of the Act is constitutional. Section 4 (a), to which 5 is
linked, suspends for five years all literacy tests and similar devices in those
States coming within the formula of 4 (b). Section 5 goes on to provide that a
State covered by 4 (b) can in no way amend its constitution or laws relating to
voting without first trying to persuade the Attorney General of the United
States or the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia that the new proposed
laws do not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying the right
to vote to citizens on account of their race or color. I think this section is
unconstitutional on at least two grounds. [383 U.S. 301, 357]
(a) The Constitution
gives federal courts jurisdiction over cases and controversies only. If it can
be said that any case or controversy arises under this section which gives the
District Court for the District of Columbia jurisdiction to approve or reject
state laws or constitutional amendments, then the case or controversy must be
between a State and the United States Government. But it is hard for me to
believe that a justiciable controversy can arise in the constitutional sense
from a desire by the United States Government or some of its officials to
determine in advance what legislative provisions a State may enact or what
constitutional amendments it may adopt. If this dispute between the Federal
Government and the States amounts to a case or controversy it is a far cry from
the traditional constitutional notion of a case or controversy as a dispute
over the meaning of enforceable laws or the manner in which they are applied.
And if by this section Congress has created a case or controversy, and I do not
believe it has, then it seems to me that the most appropriate judicial forum
for settling these important questions is this Court acting under its original
Art. III, Section 2, jurisdiction to try cases in which a State is a party.1
At least a trial in this Court would treat the States with the dignity to which
they should be entitled as constituent members of our Federal Union.
* * * *
(b) My second and
more basic objection to Section 5 is that Congress has here exercised its power
under Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment through the adoption of means that
conflict with the most basic principles of the Constitution. As the Court says
the limitations of the power granted under Section 2 are the same as the
limitations imposed on the exercise of any of the powers expressly granted
Congress by the Constitution. The classic formulation of these constitutional
limitations was stated by Chief Justice Marshall when he said in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316,
421, "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to
that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of
the constitution, are constitutional." (Emphasis added.) Section 5, by
providing that some of the States cannot pass state laws or adopt state
constitutional amendments without first being compelled to beg federal
authorities to approve their policies, so distorts our constitutional structure
of government as to render any distinction drawn in the Constitution between
state and federal power almost meaningless. One [383 U.S. 301, 359] of
the most basic premises upon which our structure of government was founded was
that the Federal Government was to have certain specific and limited powers and
no others, and all other power was to be reserved either "to the States
respectively, or to the people." Certainly if all the provisions of our
Constitution which limit the power of the Federal Government and reserve other
power to the States are to mean anything, they mean at least that the States
have power to pass laws and amend their constitutions without first sending
their officials hundreds of miles away to beg federal authorities to approve
them.2 Moreover, it seems to me that Section 5 which gives federal
officials power to veto state laws they do not like is in direct conflict with
the clear command of our Constitution that "The United States shall
guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government." I
cannot help but believe that the inevitable effect of any such law which forces
any one of the States to entreat federal authorities in far-away places for
approval of local laws before they can become effective is to [383 U.S. 301, 360] create
the impression that the State or States treated in this way are little more
than conquered provinces. And if one law concerning voting can make the States
plead for this approval by a distant federal court or the United States
Attorney General, other laws on different subjects can force the States to seek
the advance approval not only of the Attorney General but of the President
himself or any other chosen members of his staff. It is inconceivable to me
that such a radical degradation of state power was intended in any of the
provisions of our Constitution or its Amendments. Of course I do not mean to
cast any doubt whatever upon the indisputable power of the Federal Government
to invalidate a state law once enacted and operative on the ground that it
intrudes into the area of supreme federal power. But the Federal Government has
heretofore always been content to exercise this power to protect federal
supremacy by authorizing its agents to bring lawsuits against state officials
once an operative state law has created an actual case and controversy. A
federal law which assumes the power to compel the States to submit in advance
any proposed legislation they have for approval by federal agents approaches
dangerously near to wiping the States out as useful and effective units in the
government of our country. I cannot agree to any constitutional interpretation
that leads inevitably to such a result.
I see no reason to
read into the Constitution meanings it did not have when it was adopted and
which have not been put into it since. The proceedings of the original
Constitutional Convention show beyond all doubt that the power to veto or
negative state laws was denied Congress. On several occasions proposals were
submitted to the convention to grant this power to Congress. These proposals
were debated extensively and on every occasion when submitted for vote they
were overwhelmingly rejected.3 [383 U.S. 301, 361] The
refusal to give Congress this extraordinary power to veto state laws was based
on the belief that if such power resided in Congress the States would be
helpless to function as effective governments.4 Since that time
neither the Fifteenth Amendment nor any other Amendment to the Constitution has
given the slightest indication of a purpose to grant Congress the power to veto
state laws either by itself or its agents. Nor does any provision in the
Constitution endow the federal courts with power to participate with state
legislative bodies in determining what state policies shall be enacted into
law. The judicial power to invalidate a law in a case or controversy after the
law has become effective is a long way from the power to prevent a State from
passing a law. I cannot agree with the Court that Congress - denied a power in
itself to veto a state law - can delegate this same power to the Attorney
General or the District Court for the District of Columbia. For the effect on
the States is the same in both cases - they cannot pass their laws without
sending their agents to the City of Washington to plead to federal officials
for their advance approval.
Footnotes
1If 14 (b) of the Act by stating that no
court other than the District Court for the District of Columbia shall issue a
judgment under 5 is an attempt to limit the constitutionally created original
jurisdiction of this Court, then I think that section is also unconstitutional.
2The requirement that States come to
Washington to have their laws judged is reminiscent of the deeply resented
practices used by the English crown in dealing with the American colonies. One
of the abuses complained of most bitterly was the King's practice of holding
legislative and judicial proceedings in inconvenient and distant places. The
signers of the Declaration of Independence protested that the King "has
called together legislative bodies at places unusual, uncomfortable, and
distant from the depository of their public Records, for the sole purpose of
fatiguing them into compliance with his measures," and they objected to
the King's "transporting us beyond Seas to be tried for pretended offences."
These abuses were fresh in the minds of the Framers of our Constitution and in
part caused them to include in Art. 3, 2, the provision that criminal trials
"shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been
committed." Also included in the Sixth Amendment was the requirement that
a defendant in a criminal prosecution be tried by a "jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have
been previously ascertained by law."
3See Debates in the Federal Convention
of 1787 as reported by James Madison in Documents Illustrative of the Formation
of the Union of the American States (1927), pp. 605, 789, 856.
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