GIBBONS v. OGDEN
22 U.S. 1 (1824)
Mr. Chief Justice
MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court, and, after stating the case,
proceeded as follows:
The appellant
contends that this decree is erroneous, because the laws which purport to give the
exclusive privilege it sustains, are repugnant to the
constitution and laws of the United States.
They are said to be
repugnant--
1st. To that clause
in the constitution which authorizes Congress to regulate commerce.
2d. To that which authorizes Congress to promote the progress of
science and useful arts.
The State of New-York
maintains the constitutionality of these laws; and their Legislature, their
Council of Revision, and their Judges, have repeatedly concurred in this
opinion. It is supported by great names-by names which have all the titles to
consideration that virtue, intelligence, and office, can bestow. No tribunal
can approach the decision of this question, without feeling a just and real
respect for that opinion which is sustained by such authority; but it is the
province of this Court, while it respects, not to bow to it implicitly; and the
Judges must exercise, in the examination of the subject, that understanding
which Providence has bestowed upon them, with that independence which the
people of the United [22 U.S. 1, 187] States expect from
this department of the government.
As preliminary to the
very able discussions of the constitution, which we have heard from the bar,
and as having some influence on its construction, reference has been made to
the political situation of these States, anterior to its formation. It has been
said, that they were sovereign, were completely independent, and were connected
with each other only by a league. This is true. But, when these allied sovereigns
converted their league into a government, when they converted their Congress of
Ambassadors, deputed to deliberate on their common concerns, and to recommend
measures of general utility, into a Legislature, empowered to enact laws on the
most interesting subjects, the whole character in which the States appear,
underwent a change, the extent of which must be determined by a fair
consideration of the instrument by which that change was effected.
This instrument
contains an enumeration of powers expressly granted by the people to their
government. It has been said, that these powers ought to be construed strictly.
But why ought they to be so construed? Is there one sentence in the
constitution which gives countenance to this rule? In the last of the enumerated
powers, that which grants, expressly, the means for carrying all others into
execution, Congress is authorized 'to make all laws which shall be necessary
and proper' for the purpose. But this limitation on the means which may be
used, is not extended to the powers which are conferred; nor is there one
sentence in [22
U.S. 1, 188] the constitution, which has been
pointed out by the gentlemen of the bar, or which we have been able to discern,
that prescribes this rule. We do not, therefore, think ourselves justified in
adopting it. What do gentlemen mean, by a strict construction? If they contend
only against that enlarged construction, which would extend words beyond their
natural and obvious import, we might question the application of the term, but should
not controvert the principle. If they contend for that narrow construction
which, in support or some theory not to be found in the constitution, would
deny to the government those powers which the words of the grant, as usually
understood, import, and which are consistent with the general views and objects
of the instrument; for that narrow construction, which would cripple the
government, and render it unequal to the object for which it is declared to be
instituted, and to which the powers given, as fairly understood, render it
competent; then we cannot perceive the propriety of this strict construction,
nor adopt it as the rule by which the constitution is to be expounded. As men,
whose intentions require no concealment, generally employ the words which most
directly and aptly express the ideas they intend to convey, the enlightened
patriots who framed our constitution, and the people who adopted it, must be
understood to have employed words in their natural sense, and to have intended
what they have said. If, from the imperfection of human language, there should
be serious doubts respecting the extent of any given power, it is a well
settled rule, that the objects [22 U.S. 1, 189] for which it was
given, especially when those ob jects
are expressed in the instrument itself, should have great influence in the
construction. We know of no reason for excluding this rule from the present
case. The grant does not convey power which might be beneficial to the grantor,
if retained by himself, or which can enure solely to
the benefit of the grantee; but is an investment of power for the general
advantage, in the hands of agents selected for that purpose; which power can
never be exercised by the people themselves, but must be placed in the hands of
agents, or lie dormant. We know of no rule for construing the extent of such
powers, other than is given by the language of the instrument which confers
them, taken in connexion with the purposes for which
they were conferred.
The words are,
'Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among
the several States, and with the Indian tribes.'
The subject to be
regulated is commerce; and our constitution being, as was aptly said at the
bar, one of enumeration, and not of definition, to ascertain the extent of the
power, it becomes necessary to settle the meaning of the word. The counsel for
the appellee would limit it to traffic, to buying and selling, or the
interchange of commodities, and do not admit that it comprehends navigation.
This would restrict a general term, applicable to many objects, to one of its
significations. Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more: it
is intercourse. It describes the commercial [22 U.S. 1, 190] intercourse
between nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches, and is regulated by
prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse. The mind can scarcely
conceive a system for regulating commerce between nations, which shall exclude
all laws concerning navigation, which shall be silent on the admission of the
vessels of the one nation into the ports of the other, and be confined to
prescribing rules for the conduct of individuals, in the actual employment of
buying and selling, or of barter.
If commerce does not
include navigation, the government of the Union has no direct power over that
subject, and can make no law prescribing what shall constitute American
vessels, or requiring that they shall be navigated by American seamen. Yet this
power has been exercised from the commencement of the government, has been
exercised with the consent of all, and has been understood by all to be a
commercial regulation. All America understands, and has uniformly understood,
the word 'commerce,' to comprehend navigation. It was so understood, and must have
been so understood, when the constitution was framed. The power over commerce,
including navigation, was one of the primary objects for which the people of
America adopted their government, and must have been contemplated in forming
it. The convention must have used the word in that sense, because all have
understood it in that sense; and the attempt to restrict it comes too late.
If the opinion that
'commerce,' as the word is used in the constitution, comprehends navigation [22 U.S. 1, 191] also,
requires any additional confirmation, that additional confirmation is, we
think, furnished by the words of the instrument itself.
It is a rule of
construction, acknowledged by all, that the exceptions from a power mark its
extent; for it would be absurd, as well as useless, to except from a granted
power, that which was not granted- that which the words of the grant could not
comprehend. If, then, there are in the constitution plain exceptions from the
power over navigation, plain inhibitions to the exercise of that power in a
particular way, it is a proof that those who made these exceptions, and
prescribed these inhibitions, understood the power to which they applied as
being granted.
The 9th section of
the 1st article declares, that 'no preference shall be given, by any regulation
of commerce or revenue, to the ports of one State over those of another.' This
clause cannot be understood as applicable to those laws only which are passed
for the purposes of revenue, because it is expressly applied to commercial
regulations; and the most obvious preference which can be given to one port
over another, in regulating commerce, relates to navigation. But the subsequent
part of the sentence is still more exphicit. It is, 'nor shall vessels bound to or from one State, be
obliged to enter, clear, or pay duties, in another.' These words have a direct
reference to navigation.
The universally
acknowledged power of the government to impose embargoes, must also be
considered as showing, that all America is united [22 U.S. 1, 192] in
that construction which comprehends navigation in the word commerce. Gentlemen
have said, in argument, that this is a branch of the war-making power, and that
an embargo is an instrument of war, not a regulation of trade.
That it may be, and often
is, used as an instrument of war, cannot be denied. An embargo may be imposed
for the purpose of facilitating the equipment or manning of a fleet, or for the
purpose of concealing the progress of an expedition preparing to sail from a
particular port. In these, and in similar cases, it is a military instrument,
and partakes of the nature of war. But all embargoes are not of this
description. They are sometimes resorted to without a view to war, and with a
single view to commerce. In such case, an embargo is no more a war measure,
than a merchantman is a ship of war, because both are vessels which navigate
the ocean with sails and seamen.
When Congress imposed
that embargo which, for a time, engaged the attention of every man in the
United States, the avowed object of the law was, the
protection of commerce, and the avoiding of war. By its friends and its enemies
it was treated as a commercial, not as a war measure. The persevering
earnestness and zeal with which it was opposed, in a
part of our country which supposed its interests to be vitally affected by the
act, cannot be forgotten. A want of acuteness in discovering objections to a
measure to which they felt the most deep rooted hostility, will not be imputed
to those who were arrayed in opposition [22 U.S. 1, 193] to
this. Yet they never suspected that navigation was no branch of trade, and was,
therefore, not comprehended in the power to regulate commerce. They did,
indeed, contest the constitutionality of the act, but, on a principle which
admits the construction for which the appellant contends. They denied that the
particular law in question was made in pursuance of the constitution, not
because the power could not act directly on vessels, but because a perpetual
embargo was the annihilation, and not the regulation of commerce. In terms,
they admitted the applicability of the words used in the constitution to
vessels; and that, in a case which produced a degree and an extent of
excitement, calculated to draw forth every principle on which legitimate
resistance could be sustained. No example could more strongly illustrate the
universal understanding of the American people on this subject.
The word used in the
constitution, then, comprehends, and has been always understood to comprehend,
navigation within its meaning; and a power to regulate navigation, is as
expressly granted, as if that term had been added to the word 'commerce.'
To what commerce does
this power extend? The constitution informs us, to commerce 'with foreign
nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes.'
It has, we believe,
been universally admitted, that these words comprehend every species of
commercial intercourse between the United States and foreign nations. No sort
of trade can be [22
U.S. 1, 194] carried on between this country and any
other, to which this power does not extend. It has been truly said, that
commerce, as the word is used in the constitution, is a unit, every part of
which is indicated by the term.
If this be the
admitted meaning of the word, in its application to foreign nations, it must
carry the same meaning throughout the sentence, and remain a unit, unless there
be some plain intelligible cause which alters it.
The subject to which
the power is next applied, is to commerce 'among the several States.' The word
'among' means intermingled with. A thing which is among others,
is intermingled with them. Commerce among the States, cannot stop at the
external boundary line of each State, but may be introduced into the interior.
It is not intended to
say that these words comprehend that commerce, which is completely internal,
which is carried on between man and man in a State, or between different parts
of the same State, and which does not extend to or affect other States. Such a
power would be inconvenient, and is certainly unnecessary.
Comprehensive as the
word 'among' is, it may very properly be restricted to that commerce which
concerns more States than one. The phrase is not one which would probably have
been selected to indicate the completely interior traffic of a State, because
it is not an apt phrase for that purpose; and the enumeration of the particular
classes of commerce, to which the power was to be extended, would not have been
made, had the intention [22 U.S. 1, 195] been to extend the
power to every description. The enumeration presupposes something not
enumerated; and that something, if we regard the language or the subject of the
sentence, must be the exclusively internal commerce of a State. The genius and
character of the whole government seem to be, that its action is to be applied
to all the external concerns of the nation, and to those internal concerns
which affect the States generally; but not to those which are completely within
a particular State, which do not affect other States, and with which it is not
necessary to interfere, for the purpose of executing some of the general powers
of the government. The completely internal commerce of a State, then, may be
considered as reserved for the State itself.
But, in regulating
commerce with foreign nations, the power of Congress does not stop at the
jurisdictional lines of the several States. It would be a very useless power,
if it could not pass those lines. The commerce of the United States with
foreign nations, is that of the whole United States.
Every district has a right to participate in it. The deep streams which
penetrate our country in every direction, pass through the interior of almost
every State in the Union, and furnish the means of exercising this right. If
Congress has the power to regulate it, that power must be exercised whenever
the subject exists. If it exists within the States, if a foreign voyage may
commence or terminate at a port within a State, then the power of Congress may
be exercised within a State.
This principle is, if
possible, still more clear, when [22 U.S. 1, 196] applied to commerce
'among the several States.' They either join each other, in which case they are
separated by a mathematical line, or they are remote from each other, in which
case other States lie between them. What is commerce 'among' them; and how is
it to be conducted? Can a trading expedition between two adjoining States,
commence and terminate outside of each? And if the trading intercourse be
between two States remote from each other, must it not commence in one,
terminate in the other, and probably pass through a third? Commerce among the
States must, of necessity, be commerce with the States. In the regulation of
trade with the Indian tribes, the action of the law, especially when the
constitution was made, was chiefly within a State. The power of Congress, then,
whatever it may be, must be exercised within the territorial jurisdiction of
the several States. The sense of the nation on this subject,
is unequivocally manifested by the provisions made in the laws for transporting
goods, by land, between Baltimore and Providence, between New- York and
Philadelphia, and between Philadelphia and Baltimore.
We are now arrived at
the inquiry-What is this power?
It is the power to
regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed.
This power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and
acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution.
These are expressed in plain terms, and do not affect the [22 U.S. 1, 197] questions
which arise in this case, or which have been discussed at the bar. If, as has
always been understood, the sovereignty of Congress, though limited to
specified objects, is plenary as to those objects, the power over commerce with
foreign nations, and among the several States, is vested in Congress as
absolutely as it would be in a single government, having in its constitution
the same restrictions on the exercise of the power as are found in the
constitution of the United States. The wisdom and the discretion of Congress,
their identity with the people, and the influence which their constituents
possess at elections, are, in this, as in many other instances, as that, for
example, of declaring war, the sole restraints on which they have relied, to
secure them from its abuse. They are the restraints on which the people must
often they solely, in all representative governments.
The power of
Congress, then, comprehends navigation, within the limits of every State in the
Union; so far as that navigation may be, in any manner, connected with
'commerce with foreign nations, or among the several States, or with the Indian
tribes.' It may, of consequence, pass the jurisdictional line of New-York, and
act upon the very waters to which the prohibition now under consideration
applies.
But it has been urged
with great earnestness, that, although the power of Congress to regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, be co-extensive
with the subject itself, and have no other limits than are prescribed in the
constitution, yet the States may severally [22 U.S. 1, 198] exercise
the same power, within their respective jurisdictions. In support of this
argument, it is said, that they possessed it as an inseparable attribute of
sovereignty, before the formation of the constitution, and still retain it,
except so far as they have surrendered it by that instrument; that this
principle results from the nature of the government, and is secured by the
tenth amendment; that an affirmative grant of power is not exclusive, unless in
its own nature it be such that the continued exercise of it by the former
possessor is inconsistent with the grant, and that this is not of that
description.
The appellant,
conceding these postulates, except the last, contends,
that full power to regulate a particular subject, implies the whole power, and
leaves no residuum; that a grant of the whole is incompatible with the
existence of a right in another to any part of it.
Both parties have
appealed to the constitution, to legislative acts, and judicial decisions; and
have drawn arguments from all these sources, to support and illustrate the
propositions they respectively maintain.
The grant of the
power to lay and collect taxes is, like the power to regulate commerce, made in
general terms, and has never been understood to interfere with the exercise of
the same power by the State; and hence has been drawn an argument which has
been applied to the question under consideration. But the two grants are not,
it is conceived, similar in their terms or their nature. Although many of the
powers formerly [22
U.S. 1, 199] exercised by the States, are
transferred to the government of the Union, yet the State governments remain,
and constitute a most important part of our system. The power of taxation is
indispensable to their existence, and is a power which, in its own nature, is
capable of residing in, and being exercised by, different authorities at the
same time. We are accustomed to see it placed, for different purposes, in
different hands. Taxation is the simple operation of taking small portions from
a perpetually accumulating mass, susceptible of almost infinite division; and a
power in one to take what is necessary for certain purposes, is not, in its
nature, incompatible with a power in another to take what is necessary for
other purposes. Congress is authorized to lay and collect taxes, &c. to pay
the debts, and provide for the common defence and
general welfare of the United States. This does not interfere with the power of
the States to tax for the support of their own governments; nor is the exercise
of that power by the States, an exercise of any portion of the power that is
granted to the United States. In imposing taxes for State purposes, they are
not doing what Congress is empowered to do. Congress is not empowered to tax
for those purposes which are within the exclusive province of the States. When,
then, each government exercises the power of taxation, neither is exercising
the power of the other. But, when a State proceeds to regulate commerce with
foreign nations, or among the several States, it is exercising the very power
that is granted to Congress, [22 U.S. 1, 200] and is doing the very
thing which Congress is authorized to do. There is no analogy, then, between
the power of taxation and the power of regulating commerce.
In discussing the
question, whether this power is still in the States, in the case under
consideration, we may dismiss from it the inquiry, whether it is surrendered by
the mere grant to Congress, or is retained until Congress shall exercise the
power. We may dismiss that inquiry, because it has been exercised, and the
regulations which Congress deemed it proper to make, are now in full operation.
The sole question is, can a State regulate commerce
with foreign nations and among the States, while Congress is regulating it?
The counsel for the respondent answer this question in the
affirmative, and rely very much on the restrictions in the 10th section, as
supporting their opinion. They say, very truly, that limitations of a power,
furnish a strong argument in favour of the existence
of that power, and that the section which prohibits the States from laying
duties on imports or exports, proves that this power might have been exercised,
had it not been expressly forbidden; and, consequently, that any other
commercial regulation, not expressly forbidden, to which the original power of
the State was competent, may still be made.
That this restriction
shows the opinion of the Convention, that a State might impose duties on
exports and imports, if not expressly forbidden, will be conceded; but that it
follows as a consequence, [22 U.S. 1, 201] from this concession,
that a State may regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the States,
cannot be admitted.
We must first
determine whether the act of laying 'duties or imposts on imports or exports,'
is considered in the constitution as a branch of the taxing power, or of the
power to regulate commerce. We think it very clear, that it is considered as a
branch of the taxing power. It is so treated in the first clause of the 8th section:
'Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and
excises;' and, before commerce is mentioned, the rule by which the exercise of
this power must be governed, is declared. It is, that all duties, imposts, and
excises, shall be uniform. In a separate clause of the enumeration, the power
to regulate commerce is given, as being entirely distinct from the right to
levy taxes and imposts, and as being a new power, not before conferred. The
constitution, then, considers these powers as substantive,
and distinct from each other; and so places them in the enumeration it
contains. The power of imposing duties on imports is classed with the power to
levy taxes, and that seems to be its natural place. But the power to levy taxes
could never be considered as abridging the right of the States on that subject;
and they might, consequently, have exercised it by levying duties on imports or
exports, had the constitution contained no prohibition on this subject. This
prohibition, then, is an exception from the acknowledged power of the States [22 U.S. 1, 202] to
levy taxes, not from the questionable power to regulate commerce.
'A duty of tonnage' is as much a tax,
as a duty on imports or exports; and the reason which induced the prohibition
of those taxes, extends to this also. This tax may be imposed by a State, with
the consent of Congress; and it may be admitted, that Congress cannot give a
right to a State, in virtue of its own powers. But a duty of tonnage being part
of the power of imposing taxes, its prohibition may certainly be made to depend
on Congress, without affording any implication respecting a power to regulate
commerce. It is true, that duties may often be, and in fact often are, imposed
on tonnage, with a view to the regulation of commerce; but they may be also
imposed with a view to revenue; and it was, therefore, a prudent precaution, to
prohibit the States from exercising this power. The idea that the same measure
might, according to circumstances, be arranged with different classes of power,
was no novelty to the framers of our constitution. Those illustrious statesmen
and patriots had been, many of them, deeply engaged in the discussions which
preceded the war of our revolution, and all of them were well read in those
discussions. The right to regulate commerce, even by the imposition of duties,
was not controverted; but the right to impose a duty for the purpose of
revenue, produced a war as important, perhaps, in its consequences to the human
race, as any the world has ever witnessed.
These restrictions,
then, are on the taxing power, [22 U.S. 1, 203] not on that to
regulate commerce; and presuppose the existence of that which they restrain,
not of that which they do not purport to restrain.
But, the inspection
laws are said to be regulations of commerce, and are certainly recognised in the constitution, as being passed in the
exercise of a power remaining with the States.
That inspection laws
may have a remote and considerable influence on commerce, will not be denied;
but that a power to regulate commerce is the source from which the right to
pass them is derived, cannot be admitted. The object of inspection laws, is to improve the quality of articles produced by the labour of a country; to fit them for exportation; or, it may
be, for domestic use. They act upon the subject before it becomes an article of
foreign commerce, or of commerce among the States, and prepare it for that
purpose. They form a portion of that immense mass of legislation, which
embraces every thing within the territory of a State,
not surrendered to the general government: all which can be most advantageously
exercised by the States themselves. Inspection laws, quarantine laws, health
laws of every description, as well as laws for regulating the internal commerce
of a State, and those which respect turnpike roads, ferries, &c., are
component parts of this mass.
No direct general
power over these objects is granted to Congress; and, consequently, they remain
subject to State legislation. If the legislative power of the Union can reach
them, it must be for national purposes; it must be where the [22 U.S. 1, 204] power
is expressly given for a special purpose, or is clearly incidental to some
power which is expressly given. It is obvious, that the government of the
Union, in the exercise of its express powers, that, for example, of regulating
commerce with foreign nations and among the States, may use means that may also
be employed by a State, in the exercise of its acknowledged powers; that, for
example, of regulating commerce within the State. If Congress license vessels
to sail from one port to another, in the same State, the act is supposed to be,
necessarily, incidental to the power expressly granted to Congress, and implies
no claim of a direct power to regulate the purely internal commerce of a State,
or to act directly on its system of police. So, if a State, in passing laws on
subjects acknowledged to be within its control, and with a view to those
subjects, shall adopt a measure of the same character with one which Congress
may adopt, it does not derive its authority from the particular power which has
been granted, but from some other, which remains with the State, and may be
executed by the same means. All experience shows, that
the same measures, or measures scarcely distinguishable from each other, may
flow from distinct powers; but this does not prove that the powers themselves
are identical. Although the means used in their execution may sometimes
approach each other so nearly as to be confounded, there are other situations
in which they are sufficiently distinct to establish their individuality.
In our complex
system, presenting the rare and difficult scheme of one general government,
whose [22
U.S. 1, 205] action extends over the whole, but
which possesses only certain enumerated powers; and of numerous State
governments, which retain and exercise all powers not delegated to the Union,
contests respecting power must arise. Were it even otherwise, the measures
taken by the respective governments to execute their acknowledged powers, would
often be of the same description, and might, sometimes, interfere. This,
however, does not prove that the one is exercising, or has a right to exercise,
the powers of the other.
* * *
[22 U.S. 1, 209] It has
been contended by the counsel for the appellant, that, as the word 'to
regulate' implies in its nature, full power over the thing to be regulated, it
excludes, necessarily, the action of all others that would perform the same
operation on the same thing. That regulation is designed for the entire result,
applying to those parts which remain as they were, as well as to those which
are altered. It produces a uniform whole, which is as much disturbed and
deranged by changing what the regulating power designs to leave untouched, as
that on which it has operated.
There is great force in this argument, and the Court is not satisfied that
it has been refuted.
Since, however, in exercising the power of regulating their own purely
internal affairs, whether [22
U.S. 1, 210] of
trading or police, the States may sometimes enact laws, the validity of which
depends on their interfering with, and being contrary to, an act of Congress
passed in pursuance of the constitution, the Court will enter upon the inquiry,
whether the laws of New-York, as expounded by the highest tribunal of that
State, have, in their application to this case, come into collision with an act
of Congress, and deprived a citizen of a right to which that act entitles him.
Should this collision exist, it will be immaterial whether those laws were
passed in virtue of a concurrent power 'to regulate commerce with foreign
nations and among the several States,' or, in virtue of a power to regulate
their domestic trade and police. In one case and the other, the acts of
New-York must yield to the law of Congress; and the decision sustaining the
privilege they confer, against a right given by a law of the Union, must be
erroneous.
This opinion has been frequently expressed in this Court, and is founded, as
well on the nature of the government as on the words of the constitution. In
argument, however, it has been contended, that if a law passed by a State, in
the exercise of its acknowledged sovereignty, comes into conflict with a law passed
by Congress in pursuance of the constitution, they affect the subject, and each
other, like equal opposing powers.
But the framers of our constitution foresaw this state of things, and
provided for it, by declaring the supremacy not only of itself,
but of the laws made in pursuance of it. The nullity of any
act, law. The appropriate [22 U.S. 1, 211] inconsistent with the constitution, is produced by
the declaration, that the constitution is the supreme preme
law. The appropriate application of that part of the clause which confers the
same supremacy on laws and treaties, is to such acts of the State Legislatures
as do not transcend their powers, but, though enacted in the execution of
acknowledged State powers, interfere with, or are contrary to the laws of
Congress, made in pursuance of the constitution, or some treaty made under the
authority of the United States. In every such case, the act of Congress, or the
treaty, is supreme; and the law of the State, though enacted in the exercise of
powers not controverted, must yield to it.
* * *
[22 U.S. 1, 239]
DECREE. This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record
of the Court for the Trial of Impeachments and Correction of Errors of the
State of New-York, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, this
Court is of opinion, that the several licenses to the steam boats the Stoudinger and the Bellona, to carry on the coasting trade,
which are set up by the appellant, Thomas Gibbons, in his answer to the bill of
the respondent, Aaron Ogden, filed in the Court of Chancery for the State of
New-York, which were granted under an act of Congress, passed in pursuance of
the constitution of the [22
U.S. 1, 240] United
States, gave full authority to those vessels to navigate the waters of the
United States, by steam or otherwise, for the purpose of carrying on the
coasting trade, any law of the State of New-York to the contrary
notwithstanding; and that so much of the several laws of the State of New-
York, as prohibits vessels, licensed according to the laws of the United
States, from navigating the waters of the State of New-York, by means of fire
or steam, is repugnant to the said constitution, and void. This Court is,
therefore, of opinion, that the decree of the Court of New-York for the Trial
of Impeachments and the Correction of Errors, affirming the decree of the
Chancellor of that State, which perpetually enjoins the said Thomas Gibbons,
the appellant, from navigating the waters of the State of New-York with the
steam boats the Stoudinger and the Bellona, by steam
or fire, is erroneous, and ought to be reversed, and the same is hereby
reversed and annulled: and this Court doth further DIRECT, ORDER, and DECREE,
that the bill of the said Aaron Ogden be dismissed, and the same is hereby
dismissed accordingly.