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U.S. Supreme Court
The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 10 Wall. 557 557 (1870)
The
Daniel Ball
77 U.S.
(10 Wall.) 557
APPEAL
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR
THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
[77 U. S., 558] The act of July 7, 1838,1 provides in its
second section that it shall not be lawful for the owner, master, or captain of
any vessel propelled in whole or in part by steam to transport any merchandise
or passengers upon "the bays, lakes, rivers, or other navigable waters of
the United States" after the 1st of October of that year without having
first obtained from the proper officer a license under existing laws, that for
every violation of this enactment the owner or owners of the vessel shall
forfeit and pay to the United States the sum of five hundred dollars, and that
for this sum the vessel engaged shall be liable and may be seized and proceeded
against summarily by libel in the District Court of the United States.
The act of August 30, 1852,2
which is amendatory of the act of July 7, 1838, provides for the inspection of
vessels propelled in whole or in part by steam and carrying passengers and the
delivery to the collector of the district of a certificate of such inspection
before a license, register, or enrollment, under either of the acts can be
granted, and declares that if any vessel of this kind is navigated with
passengers on board, without complying with the terms of the act, the owners
and the vessel shall be subject to the penalties prescribed by the second
section of the act of 1838.
In March, 1868, the Daniel
Ball, a vessel propelled by steam, of one hundred and twenty-three tons
burden, was engaged in navigating Grand River, in the State of Michigan,
between the Cities of Grand Rapids and Grand Haven, and in the transportation
of merchandise and passengers between those places without having been
inspected or licensed under the laws of the United States, and to recover the
penalty provided for want of such inspection and license, the United States
filed a libel in the District Court for the Western District of Michigan.
[77 U. S., 559] The libel, as amended, described Grand River as a
navigable water of the United States, and in addition to the employment stated
above, alleged that in such employment the steamer transported merchandise
shipped on board of her destined for ports and places in states other than the
State of Michigan, and was thus engaged in commerce between the states.
The answer of the owners, who
appeared in the case, admitted substantially the employment of the steamer as
alleged, but set up as a defense that Grand River was not a navigable water of
the United States, and that the steamer was engaged solely in domestic trade
and commerce, and was not engaged in trade or commerce between two or more
states or in any trade by reason of which she was subject to the navigation
laws of the United States or was required to be inspected and licensed.
It was admitted by
stipulation of the parties that the steamer was employed in the navigation of
Grand River between the Cities of Grand Rapids and Grand Haven and in the
transportation of merchandise and passengers between those places; that she was
not enrolled and licensed for the coasting trade; that some of the goods that
she shipped at Grand Rapids and carried to Grand Haven were destined and marked
for places in other states than Michigan, and that some of the goods which she
shipped at Grand Haven came from other states and were destined for places within
that state.
It was also admitted that
the steamer was so constructed as to draw only two feet of water, and was
incapable of navigating the waters of Lake Michigan; that she was a common
carrier between the cities named, but did not run in connection with or in
continuation of any line of steamers or vessels on the lake or any line of
railway in the state, although there were various lines of steamers and other
vessels running from places in other states to Grand Haven carrying
merchandise, and a line of railway was running from Detroit which touched at
both of the cities named.
The district court dismissed the libel. The circuit court [77 U. S., 560] reversed this
decision, and gave a decree for the penalty demanded.
From this decree the case
was brought by appeal to this Court.
[77 U. S. 562] MR. JUSTICE
FIELD, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the Court as follows:
Two questions are presented
in this case for our determination.
First, whether the steamer
was at the time designated in the libel engaged in transporting merchandise and
passengers on a navigable water of the United States within the meaning of the
acts of Congress, and [77 U. S., 563] second, whether those
acts are applicable to a steamer engaged as a common carrier between places in
the same state when a portion of the merchandise transported by her is destined
to places in other states or comes from places without the state, she not
running in connection with or in continuation of any line of steamers or other
vessels or any railway line leading to or from another state.
Upon the first of these
questions we entertain no doubt. The doctrine of the common law as to the
navigability of waters has no application in this country. Here, the ebb and
flow of the tide do not constitute the usual test, as in England, or any test
at all of the navigability of waters. There, no waters are navigable in fact,
or at least to any considerable extent, which are not subject to the tide, and
from this circumstance tidewater and navigable water there signify
substantially the same thing. But in this country, the case is widely
different. Some of our rivers are as navigable for many hundreds of miles above
as they are below the limits of tidewater, and some of them are navigable for great
distances by large vessels which are not even affected by the tide at any point
during their entire length.3 A different test must therefore be
applied to determine the navigability of our rivers, and that is found in their
navigable capacity. Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in
law which are navigable in fact. And they are navigable in fact when they are
used or are susceptible of being used in their ordinary condition as highways
for commerce over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the
customary modes of trade and travel on water. And they constitute navigable
waters of the United States within the meaning of the acts of Congress, in
contradistinction from the navigable waters of the states, when they form in
their ordinary condition by themselves, or by uniting with other waters, a
continued highway over which commerce is or may be carried on with other states
or foreign countries in the customary modes in which such commerce is conducted
by water.
[77 U. S., 564] If we apply this test to Grand River, the conclusion
follows that it must be regarded as a navigable water of the United States.
From the conceded facts in the case, the stream is capable of bearing a steamer
of one hundred and twenty-three tons burden, laden with merchandise and
passengers, as far as Grand Rapids, a distance of forty miles from its mouth in
Lake Michigan. And by its junction with the lake it forms a continued highway
for commerce both with other states and with foreign countries, and is thus
brought under the direct control of Congress in the exercise of its commercial
power.
That power authorizes all
appropriate legislation for the protection or advancement of either interstate
or foreign commerce, and for that purpose such legislation as will insure the
convenient and safe navigation of all the navigable waters of the United
States, whether that legislation consists in requiring the removal of obstructions
to their use, in prescribing the form and size of the vessels employed upon
them, or in subjecting the vessels to inspection and license in order to insure
their proper construction and equipment. "The power to regulate
commerce," this Court said in Gilman v. Philadelphia,4 "comprehends the control
for that purpose, and to the extent necessary, of all navigable waters of the
United States which are accessible from a state other than those in which they
lie. For this purpose, they are the public property of the nation and subject
to all the requisite legislation of Congress."
But it is contended that the
steamer Daniel Ball was only engaged in the internal commerce of the
State of Michigan, and was not, therefore, required to be inspected or licensed
even if it be conceded that Grand River is a navigable water of the United
States, and this brings us to the consideration of the second question
presented.
There is undoubtedly an
internal commerce which is subject to the control of the states. The power
delegated to Congress is limited to commerce "among the
several states," [77 U. S., 565] with foreign nations, and with the
Indian tribes. This limitation necessarily excludes from federal control all
commerce not thus designated, and of course that commerce which is carried on
entirely within the limits of a state and does not extend to or affect other
states.5 In this case, it is admitted that the steamer was engaged
in shipping and transporting down Grand River goods destined and marked for
other states than Michigan, and in receiving and transporting up the river
goods brought within the state from without its limits, but inasmuch as her
agency in the transportation was entirely within the limits of the state and
she did not run in connection with or in continuation of any line of vessels or
railway leading to other states, it is contended that she was engaged entirely
in domestic commerce. But this conclusion does not follow. So far as she was
employed in transporting goods destined for other states or goods brought from
without the limits of Michigan and destined to places within that state, she was
engaged in commerce between the states, and however limited that commerce may
have been, she was, so far as it went, subject to the legislation of Congress.
She was employed as an instrument of that commerce, for whenever a commodity
has begun to move as an article of trade from one state to another, commerce in
that commodity between the states has commenced. The fact that several
different and independent agencies are employed in transporting the commodity,
some acting entirely in one state and some acting through two or more states,
does in no respect affect the character of the transaction. To the extent in
which each agency acts in that transportation, it is subject to the regulation
of Congress.
It is said that if the
position here asserted be sustained, there is no such thing as the domestic
trade of a state; that Congress may take the entire control of the commerce of
the country and extend its regulations to the railroads within a state on which
grain or fruit is transported to a distant market.
[77 U. S., 566] We answer that the present case relates to
transportation on the navigable waters of the United States, and we are not
called upon to express an opinion upon the power of Congress over interstate
commerce when carried on by land transportation. And we answer further that we
are unable to draw any clear and distinct line between the authority of
Congress to regulate an agency employed in commerce between the states when
that agency extends through two or more states and when it is confined in its
action entirely within the limits of a single state. If its authority does not
extend to an agency in such commerce when that agency is confined within the
limits of a state, its entire authority over interstate commerce may be
defeated. Several agencies combining, each taking up the commodity transported
at the boundary line at one end of a state and leaving it at the boundary line
at the other end, the federal jurisdiction would be entirely ousted and the
constitutional provision would become a dead letter.
We perceive no error in the
record, and the decree of the circuit court must be
Affirmed.
15 Stat. at Large 304.
210 id. 61.
3The Genesee Chief, 12 How. 457; The Hine v. Trevor,
4 Wall. 555.
470 U. S. 3 Wall.
724.