COOPER v. AARON
358 U.S. 1 (1958)
No.
1.
Argued September 11, 1958.
Decided September 12, 1958.
Opinion announced September 29, 1958.
Fn [358 U.S. 1, 1] NOTE:
The per curiam opinion announced on September 12,
1958, and printed in a footnote, post, p. 5, applies not only to this case but
also to No. 1, Misc., August Special Term, 1958, Aaron et al. v. Cooper et al.,
on application for vacation of order of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit staying issuance of its mandate, for stay of order of the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, and for such
other orders as petitioners may be entitled to, argued August 28, 1958.
Under a plan of
gradual desegregation of the races in the public schools of Little Rock,
Arkansas, adopted by petitioners and approved by the courts below, respondents,
Negro children, were ordered admitted to a previously all-white high school at
the beginning of the 1957-1958 school year. Due to actions by the Legislature
and Governor of the State opposing desegregation, and to threats of mob violence
resulting therefrom, respondents were unable to attend the school until troops
were sent and maintained there by the Federal Government for their protection;
but they [358
U.S. 1, 2] attended the school for the remainder
of that school year. Finding that these events had resulted in tensions,
bedlam, chaos and turmoil in the school, which disrupted the educational
process, the District Court, in June 1958, granted petitioners' request that
operation of their plan of desegregation be suspended
for two and one-half years, and that respondents be sent back to segregated
schools. The Court of Appeals reversed. Held: The judgment of the Court of
Appeals is affirmed, and the orders of the District Court enforcing
petitioners' plan of desegregation are reinstated, effective immediately. Pp.
4-20.
1. This Court cannot countenance a
claim by the Governor and Legislature of a State that there is no duty on state
officials to obey federal court orders resting on this Court's considered
interpretation of the United States Constitution in Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 . P. 4.
2. This Court rejects the contention
that it should uphold a suspension of the Little Rock School Board's plan to do
away with segregated public schools in Little Rock until state laws and efforts
to upset and nullify its holding in the Brown case have been further challenged
and tested in the courts. P. 4.
3. In many locations, obedience to the
duty of desegregation will require the immediate general admission of Negro
children, otherwise qualified as students for their appropriate classes, at
particular schools. P. 7.
4. If, after analysis of the relevant
factors (which, of course, excludes hostility to racial desegregation), a
District Court concludes that justification exists for not requiring the
present nonsegregated admission of all qualified
Negro children to public schools, it should scrutinize the program of the
school authorities to make sure that they have developed arrangements pointed
toward the earliest practicable completion of desegregation, and have taken
appropriate steps to put their program into effective operation. P. 7.
5. The petitioners stand in this
litigation as the agents of the State, and they cannot assert their good faith
as an excuse for delay in implementing the respondents' constitutional rights,
when vindication of those rights has been rendered difficult or impossible by
the actions of other state officials. Pp. 15-16.
6. The constitutional rights of
respondents are not to be sacrificed or yielded to the violence and disorder
which have followed [358
U.S. 1, 3] upon the actions of the Governor and
Legislature, and law and order are not here to be preserved by depriving the
Negro children of their constitutional rights. P. 16.
7. The constitutional rights of
children not to be discriminated against in school admission on grounds of race
or color declared by this Court in the Brown case can neither be nullified
openly and directly by state legislators or state executives or judicial
officers, nor nullified indirectly by them through evasive schemes for
segregation whether attempted "ingeniously or ingenuously." Pp.
16-17.
8. The interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the supreme law of the
land, and Art. VI of the Constitution makes it of binding effect on the States
"any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding." P. 18.
9. No state legislator or executive or
judicial officer can war against the Constitution without violating his solemn
oath to support it. P. 18.
10. State support of segregated schools
through any arrangement, management, funds or property cannot be squared with
the command of the Fourteenth Amendment that no State shall deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. P.
19.
257
F.2d 33, affirmed.
Opinion of the Court by THE CHIEF
JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE BLACK, MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, MR.
JUSTICE BURTON, MR. JUSTICE CLARK, MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, and
MR. JUSTICE WHITTAKER.
As this case reaches us it raises
questions of the highest importance to the maintenance of our federal system of
government. It necessarily involves a claim by the Governor and Legislature of
a State that there is no duty on state officials to obey federal court orders
resting on this Court's considered interpretation of the United States
Constitution. Specifically it involves actions by the Governor and Legislature
of Arkansas upon the premise that they are not bound by our holding in Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 . That holding was that the Fourteenth
Amendment forbids States to use their governmental powers to bar children on
racial grounds from attending schools where there is state participation
through any arrangement, management, funds or property. We are urged to uphold
a suspension of the Little Rock School Board's plan to do away with segregated
public schools in Little Rock until state laws and efforts to upset and nullify
our holding in Brown v. Board of Education have been further challenged and
tested in the courts. We reject these contentions.
The case was argued before us on
September 11, 1958. On the following day we unanimously affirmed the judgment
of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, 257 F.2d 33, which had reversed
a judgment of the District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, 163 F.
Supp. 13. The District Court had granted the application of the petitioners,
the Little Rock School Board and School Superintendent, to suspend for two and
one-half years the operation of the School Board's court-approved desegregation
program. In order that the School Board [358 U.S. 1, 5] might know, without doubt, its duty in this
regard before the opening of school, which had been set for the following
Monday, September 15, 1958, we immediately issued the judgment, reserving the
expression of our supporting views to a later date. * This opinion of all of the
members of the Court embodies those views.
The following are the facts and
circumstances so far as necessary to show how the legal questions are
presented.
On May 17, 1954, this Court
decided that enforced racial segregation in the public schools of a State is a
denial of the equal protection of the laws enjoined by the Fourteenth
Amendment. Brown v. Board of Education, [358 U.S. 1, 6] 347 U.S. 483 . The
Court postponed, pending further argument, formulation of a decree to
effectuate this decision. That decree was rendered May 31, 1955. Brown v. Board
of Education, 349 U.S. 294 . In the formulation of
that decree the Court recognized that good faith compliance with the principles
declared in Brown might in some situations "call for elimination of a variety
of obstacles in making the transition to school systems operated in accordance
with the constitutional principles set forth in our May 17, 1954,
decision." Id., at 300. The Court went on to
state:
"Courts of equity may properly take
into account the public interest in the elimination of such obstacles in a
systematic and effective manner. But it should go without saying that the
vitality of these constitutional principles cannot be allowed to yield simply
because of disagreement with them.
"While giving weight to these public
and private considerations, the courts will require that the defendants make a
prompt and reasonable start toward full compliance with our May 17, 1954,
ruling. Once such a start has been made, the courts may find that additional
time is necessary to carry out the ruling in an effective manner. The burden
rests upon the defendants to establish that such time is necessary in the
public interest and is consistent with good faith compliance at the earliest
practicable date. To that end, the courts may consider problems related to
administration, arising from the physical condition of the school plant, the
school transportation system, personnel, revision of school districts and
attendance areas into compact units to achieve a system of determining
admission to the public schools on a nonracial basis, and revision of local
laws and regulations which may be necessary in solving the foregoing
problems." 349 U.S., at 300 -301. [358 U.S. 1,
7]
Under such circumstances, the
District Courts were directed to require "a prompt and reasonable start
toward full compliance," and to take such action as was necessary to bring
about the end of racial segregation in the public schools "with all
deliberate speed." Ibid. Of course, in many locations,
obedience to the duty of desegregation would require the immediate general
admission of Negro children, otherwise qualified as students for their
appropriate classes, at particular schools. On the other hand, a District
Court, after analysis of the relevant factors (which, of course, excludes
hostility to racial desegregation), might conclude that justification existed
for not requiring the present nonsegregated admission
of all qualified Negro children. In such circumstances, however, the courts should
scrutinize the program of the school authorities to make sure that they had
developed arrangements pointed toward the earliest practicable completion of
desegregation, and had taken appropriate steps to put their program into
effective operation. It was made plain that delay in any guise in order to deny
the constitutional rights of Negro children could not be countenanced, and that
only a prompt start, diligently and earnestly pursued, to eliminate racial
segregation from the public schools could constitute good faith compliance.
State authorities were thus duty bound to devote every effort toward initiating
desegregation and bringing about the elimination of racial discrimination in
the public school system.
On May 20, 1954, three days after the first Brown opinion, the Little Rock District School Board adopted, and on May 23, 1954, made public, a statement of policy entitled "Supreme Court Decision - Segregation in Public Schools." In this statement the Board recognized that
"It is our responsibility to comply
with Federal Constitutional Requirements and we intend to do so when the
Supreme Court of the United States outlines the method to be followed."
[358 U.S. 1, 8]
Thereafter the Board undertook
studies of the administrative problems confronting the transition to a
desegregated public school system at Little Rock. It instructed the
Superintendent of Schools to prepare a plan for desegregation, and approved
such a plan on May 24, 1955, seven days before the second Brown opinion. The
plan provided for desegregation at the senior high school level (grades 10
through 12) as the first stage. Desegregation at the junior high and elementary
levels was to follow. It was contemplated that desegregation at the high school
level would commence in the fall of 1957, and the expectation was that complete
desegregation of the school system would be accomplished by 1963. Following the
adoption of this plan, the Superintendent of Schools discussed it with a large
number of citizen groups in the city. As a result of these discussions, the
Board reached the conclusion that "a large majority of the residents"
of Little Rock were of "the belief . . . that the Plan, although
objectionable in principle," from the point of view of those supporting
segregated schools, "was still the best for the interests of all pupils in
the District."
Upon challenge by a group of
Negro plaintiffs desiring more rapid completion of the desegregation process,
the District Court upheld the School Board's plan, Aaron v. Cooper, 143 F.
Supp. 855. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 243 F.2d 361.
Review of that judgment was not sought here.
While the School Board was thus
going forward with its preparation for desegregating the Little Rock school
system, other state authorities, in contrast, were actively pursuing a program
designed to perpetuate in Arkansas the system of racial segregation which this
Court had held violated the Fourteenth Amendment. First came, in November 1956,
an amendment to the State Constitution flatly commanding the Arkansas General
Assembly to oppose "in every Constitutional manner the Un-constitutional
[358 U.S. 1, 9] desegregation decisions
of May 17, 1954 and May 31, 1955 of the United States Supreme Court," Ark.
Const., Amend. 44, and, through the initiative, a pupil
assignment law, Ark. Stat. 80-1519 to 80-1524. Pursuant to this state constitutional
command, a law relieving school children from compulsory attendance at racially
mixed schools, Ark. Stat. 80-1525, and a law establishing a State Sovereignty
Commission, Ark. Stat. 6-801 to 6-824, were enacted by the General Assembly in
February 1957.
The School Board and the
Superintendent of Schools nevertheless continued with preparations to carry out
the first stage of the desegregation program. Nine Negro children were
scheduled for admission in September 1957 to Central High School, which has
more than two thousand students. Various administrative measures, designed to
assure the smooth transition of this first stage of desegregation, were
undertaken.
On September 2, 1957, the day
before these Negro students were to enter Central High, the school authorities
were met with drastic opposing action on the part of the Governor of Arkansas
who dispatched units of the Arkansas National Guard to the Central High School
grounds and placed the school "off limits" to colored students. As
found by the District Court in subsequent proceedings, the Governor's action
had not been requested by the school authorities, and was entirely unheralded.
The findings were these:
"Up to this time [September 2], no crowds had gathered about Central High School and no acts of violence or threats of violence in connection with the carrying out of the plan had occurred. Nevertheless, out of an abundance of caution, the school authorities had frequently conferred with the Mayor and Chief of Police of Little Rock about taking appropriate [358 U.S. 1, 10] steps by the Little Rock police to prevent any possible disturbances or acts of violence in connection with the attendance of the 9 colored students at Central High School. The Mayor considered that the Little Rock police force could adequately cope with any incidents which might arise at the opening of school. The Mayor, the Chief of Police, and the school authorities made no request to the Governor or any representative of his for State assistance in maintaining peace and order at Central High School. Neither the Governor nor any other official of the State government consulted with the Little Rock authorities about whether the Little Rock police were prepared to cope with any incidents which might arise at the school, about any need for State assistance in maintaining peace and order, or about stationing the Arkansas National Guard at Central High School." Aaron v. Cooper, 156 F. Supp. 220, 225.
* * *
In affirming the judgment of the
Court of Appeals which reversed the District Court we have accepted without
reservation the position of the School Board, the [358 U.S. 1, 15] Superintendent of Schools, and their counsel
that they displayed entire good faith in the conduct of these proceedings and
in dealing with the unfortunate and distressing sequence of events which has
been outlined. We likewise have accepted the findings of the District Court as
to the conditions at Central High School during the 1957-1958 school year, and also the findings that the educational progress of
all the students, white and colored, of that school has suffered and will
continue to suffer if the conditions which prevailed last year are permitted to
continue.
The significance of these findings, however, is to be considered in light of the fact, indisputably revealed by the record before us, that the conditions they depict are directly traceable to the actions of legislators and executive officials of the State of Arkansas, taken in their official capacities, which reflect their own determination to resist this Court's decision in the Brown case and which have brought about violent resistance to that decision in Arkansas. In its petition for certiorari filed in this Court, the School Board itself describes the situation in this language: "The legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the state government opposed the desegregation of Little Rock schools by enacting laws, calling out troops, making statements villifying federal law and federal courts, and failing to utilize state law enforcement agencies and judicial processes to maintain public peace."
* * *
What has been said, in the light
of the facts developed, is enough to dispose of the case. However, we should answer
the premise of the actions of the Governor and Legislature that they are not
bound by our holding in the Brown case. It is necessary only to recall some
basic constitutional propositions which are settled doctrine. [358 U.S. 1, 18]
Article VI of the Constitution
makes the Constitution the "supreme Law of the Land." In 1803, Chief
Justice Marshall, speaking for a unanimous Court, referring to the Constitution
as "the fundamental and paramount law of the nation," declared in the
notable case of Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177, that "It is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the
law is." This decision declared the basic principle that the federal
judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that
principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the Country as a
permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system. It follows
that the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court in
the Brown case is the supreme law of the land, and Art. VI of the Constitution
makes it of binding effect on the States "any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." Every state legislator
and executive and judicial officer is solemnly committed by oath taken pursuant
to Art. VI, cl. 3, "to support this Constitution."
Chief Justice Taney, speaking for a unanimous Court in 1859, said that this
requirement reflected the framers' "anxiety to preserve it [the
Constitution] in full force, in all its powers, and to guard against resistance
to or evasion of its authority, on the part of a State . . . ." Ableman v.
Booth, 21 How. 506, 524.
No state legislator or executive
or judicial officer can war against the Constitution without violating his
undertaking to support it. Chief Justice Marshall spoke for a unanimous Court
in saying that: "If the legislatures of the several states may, at will,
annul the judgments of the courts of the United States, and destroy the rights
acquired under those judgments, the constitution itself becomes a solemn
mockery . . . ." United States v. Peters, 5 Cranch 115,
136. A Governor who asserts a [358 U.S. 1, 19] power to nullify a federal court order is
similarly restrained. If he had such power, said Chief Justice Hughes, in 1932,
also for a unanimous Court, "it is manifest that the fiat of a state
Governor, and not the Constitution of the United States, would be the supreme
law of the land; that the restrictions of the Federal Constitution upon the exercise
of state power would be but impotent phrases . . . ." Sterling
v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 397 -398.
It is, of course, quite true that the responsibility for public education is primarily the concern of the States, but it is equally true that such responsibilities, like all other state activity, must be exercised consistently with federal constitutional requirements as they apply to state action. The Constitution created a government dedicated to equal justice under law. The Fourteenth Amendment embodied and emphasized that ideal. State support of segregated schools through any arrangement, management, funds, or property cannot be squared with the Amendment's command that no State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. The right of a student not to be segregated on racial grounds in schools so maintained is indeed so fundamental and pervasive that it is embraced in the concept of due process of law. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 . The basic decision in Brown was unanimously reached by this Court only after the case had been briefed and twice argued and the issues had been given the most serious consideration. Since the first Brown opinion three new Justices have come to the Court. They are at one with the Justices still on the Court who participated in that basic decision as to its correctness, and that decision is now unanimously reaffirmed. The principles announced in that decision and the obedience of the States to them, according to the command of the Constitution, [358 U.S. 1, 20] are indispensable for the protection of the freedoms guaranteed by our fundamental charter for all of us. Our constitutional ideal of equal justice under law is thus made a living truth.