CHAPLINSKY v. STATE OF NEW
HAMPSHIRE
315 U.S. 568
Argued: February 5,
1942 Decided: March 9, 1942
Mr. Justice MURPHY delivered the
opinion of the Court.
Appellant, a member
of the sect known as Jehovah's Witnesses, was convicted in the municipal court
of Rochester, New Hampshire, for violation of Chapter 378, Section 2, of the
Public Laws of New Hampshire: 'No person shall address any offensive, derisive
or annoying word to any other person who is lawfully in any street or other
public place, nor call him by any offensive or derisive name, nor make any
noise or exclamation in his presence and hearing with intent to deride, offend
or annoy him, or to prevent him from pursuing his lawful business or occupation.'
The complaint charged
that appellant 'with force and arms, in a certain public place in said city of
Rochester, to wit, on the public sidewalk on the easterly side of Wakefield
Street, near unto the entrance of the City Hall, did unlawfully repeat, the
words following, addressed to the complainant, that is to say, 'You are a God
damned racketeer' and 'a damned Fascist and the whole government of Rochester
are Fascists or agents of Fascists' the same being offensive, derisive and
annoying words and names'.
Upon appeal there was
a trial de novo of appellant before a jury in the Superior Court. He was found
guilty and the judgment of conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the
State. 91 N.H. 310, 18 A.2d 754.
* *
There is no
substantial dispute over the facts. Chaplinsky was distributing the literature
of his sect on the streets [315 U.S. 568, 570] of
Rochester on a busy Saturday afternoon. Members of the local citizenry
complained to the City Marshal, Bowering, that Chaplinsky was denouncing all
religion as a 'racket'. Bowering told them that Chaplinsky was lawfully
engaged, and then warned Chaplinsky that the crowd was getting restless. Some time later a disturbance occurred and the traffic
officer on duty at the busy intersection started with Chaplinsky for the police
station, but did not inform him that he was under arrest or that he was going
to be arrested. On the way they encountered Marshal Bowering who had been
advised that a riot was under way and was therefore hurrying to the scene.
Bowering repeated his earlier warning to Chaplinsky who then addressed to
Bowering the words set forth in the complaint.
Chaplinsky's version
of the affair was slightly different. He testified that when he met Bowering,
he asked him to arrest the ones responsible for the disturbance. In reply
Bowering cursed him and told him to come along. Appellant admitted that he said
the words charged in the complaint with the exception of
the name of the Deity.
Over appellant's
objection the trial court excluded as immaterial testimony relating to
appellant's mission 'to preach the true facts of the Bible', his treatment at
the hands of the crowd, and the alleged neglect of duty on the part of the
police. This action was approved by the court below which held that neither
provocation nor the truth of the utterance would constitute a defense to the
charge.
* *
Appellant assails the
statute as a violation of all three freedoms, speech, press and worship, but
only an attack on the basis of free speech is
warranted. The spoken, not the written, word is involved. And we cannot
conceive that cursing a public officer is the exercise of religion in any sense
of the term. But even if the activities of the appellant which preceded the
incident could be viewed as religious in character, and therefore entitled to
the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment, they would not cloak him with
immunity from the legal consequences for concomitant acts committed in
violation of a valid criminal statute. We turn, therefore, to an examination of
the statute itself.
Allowing the broadest
scope to the language and purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is well
understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at
all times and under all circumstances. 2 There are certain well-defined and narrowly
limited classes of speech, the prevention [315 U.S. 568,
572] and punishment of which has never been thought to
raise any Constitutional problem. 3 These include the lewd and obscene, the profane,
the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words-those which by their very
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace. 4 It has been well observed that such utterances
are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. 5 'Resort to epithets or personal abuse is not in any
proper sense communication of information or opinion safeguarded by the
Constitution, and its punishment as a criminal act would raise no question
under that instrument.' Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296, 309 , 310 S., 60 S.Ct. 900, 906, 128
A.L.R. 1352.
The state statute
here challenged comes to us authoritatively construed by the highest court of
New Hampshire. It has two provisions-the first relates to words or names
addressed to another in a public place; the second refers to noises and
exclamations. The court (91 N.H. 310, 18 A. 2d 757) said: 'The two provisions
are distinct. One may stand separately from the other. Assuming, without
holding, that the second were unconstitutional, the first could stand if
constitutional.' We accept that construction of severability and limit our
consideration to the first provision of the statute. 6 [315 U.S. 568,
573] On the authority of its earlier decisions, the state
court declared that the statute's purpose was to preserve the public peace, no
words being 'forbidden except such as have a direct tendency to cause acts of
violence by the person to whom, individually, the remark is addressed'.7 It was
further said: 'The word 'offensive' is not to be defined in terms of what a
particular addressee thinks. ... The test is what men of common intelligence
would understand would be words likely to cause an average addressee to fight.
... The English language has a number of words and
expressions which by general consent and 'fighting words' when said without a
disarming smile. ... Such words, as ordinary men know, are likely to cause a
fight. So are threatening, profane or obscene revilings.
Derisive and annoying words can be taken as coming within the purview of the
statute as heretofore interpreted only when they have this characteristic of
plainly tending to excite the addressee to a breach of the peace. ... The
statute, as construed, does no more than prohibit the face-to-face words
plainly likely to cause a breach of the peace by the addressee, words whose
speaking constitute a breach of the peace by the speaker-including 'classical
fighting words', words in current use less 'classical' but equally likely to
cause violence, and other disorderly words, including profanity, obscenity and
threats.'
We are unable to say
that the limited scope of the statute as thus construed contravenes the
constitutional right of free expression. It is a statute narrowly drawn and
limited to define and punish specific conduct lying within the domain of state
power, the use in a public place of words likely to cause a breach of the
peace. Cf. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296, 311 , 60 S.Ct. 900, 906, 128 A.L.R.
1352; Thornhill v. Alabama, [315 U.S. 568, 574] 310 U.S. 88,
105 , 60 S.Ct. 736, 745. This conclusion
necessarily disposes of appellant's contention that the statute is so vague and
indefinite as to render a conviction thereunder a violation of due process. A
statute punishing verbal acts, carefully drawn so as not unduly to impair
liberty of expression, is not too vague for a criminal law. Cf. Fox v.
Washington, 236 U.S.
273, 277 , 35 S.Ct. 383, 384.8
Nor can we say that the
application of the statute to the facts disclosed by the record substantially
or unreasonably impinges upon the privilege of free speech. Argument is
unnecessary to demonstrate that the appellations 'damn racketeer' and 'damn
Fascist' are epithets likely to provoke the average person to retaliation, and
thereby cause a breach of the peace.
* *
Affirmed.